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COMPETITION LAW  
ENFORCEMENT IN CHINA:  
BETWEEN TECHNOCRACY AND 
INDUSTRIAL POLICY 
YANE SVETIEV* AND LEI WANG** 
I 
INTRODUCTION 
China is a relative newcomer to competition law. Though many jurisdictions 
around the world adopted competition laws beginning in the early 1990s, China’s 
Anti-Monopoly Law (AML) was enacted only in 2007.1 At least three other 
features distinguish China’s experience with competition policy. First, China 
enacted its competition law as part of a gradual evolution of domestic economic 
and regulatory policy, rather than as a result of pressure or conditionality from 
international development and funding bodies, such as the World Bank or the 
International Monetary Fund, 2  or from mature competition jurisdictions. 3 
Second, unlike the laws of some recent adopters,4 the AML is not a wholesale 
transplant of a pre-existing template of the competition law and enforcement 
apparatus of a mature jurisdiction. Although China sought to learn from the legal 
texts and enforcement experiences of established competition regimes, the AML 
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1. Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Fan Longduan Fa (中华⼈⺠共和国反垄断法) [Anti-Monopoly
Law of the People’s Republic of China] (promulgated by the Standing Comm. Nat’l People’s Cong., Aug. 
30, 2007, effective Aug. 1, 2008) [hereinafter AML], http://www.china.org.cn/government/laws/2009-
02/10/content_17254169.htm [https://perma.cc/59KN-PJXC]. 
2.  See Deunden Nikomborirak, The Political Economy Of Competition Law: The Case Of
Thailand, 26 NW. J. INT’L L. & BUS. 597, 598 (2006) (noting the IMF conditions in the case of Indonesia); 
D. I. Waked, Adoption of Antitrust Laws in Developing Countries: Reasons and Challenges, 12 J.L.
ECON. & POL’Y 193, 200 (2016).
3.  See Thomas J. Doleys, Promoting Competition Policy Abroad: European Union Efforts in the
Developing World, 57 ANTITRUST BULL. 337, 340 (2012) (surveying “EU efforts to promote the 
introduction and development of competition policies in the developing world”).  
4.  See, e.g., Michal Gal, The “Cut and Paste” of Article 82 of the EC Treaty in Israel: Conditions for 
a Successful Transplant, 9 EUR. J. L. REFORM 467 (2008) (analyzing the Israeli Competition Act). 
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reflects a more deliberate process of selecting features from different competition 
policy models5 and includes a number of rules specifically tailored to the Chinese 
setting. 6  Finally, unlike with many other transplanted competition laws, 7  the 
enactment of the AML was not followed by a long period of dormancy whereby 
the law went unenforced. Instead, even as the AML came into force and in the 
period thereafter, the responsible authorities issued a steady stream of decisions 
and have maintained consistent levels of enforcement activity over time.8 
The relative global importance of the Chinese economy and the number of 
competition decisions affecting international firms have generated considerable 
interest both in understanding the reasons for the quick uptake of competition 
policy, as well as in characterizing and assessing China’s emergent competition 
practice. A number of scholars have examined the legislative process behind the 
AML in an effort to explain the peculiar Chinese characteristics of the law.9 The 
degree of convergence of the AML with common international antitrust rules 
 
 5.  See Nathan Bush, The PRC Antimonopoly Law: Unanswered Questions and Challenges Ahead, 
ANTITRUST SOURCE 1 (Oct. 2007), http://www.abanet.org/antitrust/at-source/07/10/Oct07-Bush10-
18f.pdf [https://perma.cc/SF3W-EM7U]; see generally Lei Wang & Ivo Krizic, External vs. Domestic: The 
Evolution of China’s Competition Regime, FIFTH MEETING OF THE UNCTAD RESEARCH 
PARTNERSHIP PLATFORM, (July 11, 2014) http://unctad.org/meetings/en/Contribution/CCPB_RPP 
2014_Paper_KW_en.pdf [https://perma.cc/C32D-N5YB]. 
 6.  E.g., AML, supra note 1, at art. 7 (relating to business operations of companies in the state-
owned economy); id. at art. 8, ch. V (relating to abuse of administrative power to restrict or eliminate 
competition); id. at arts. 9–10 (providing the basis for the unique tripartite enforcement regime). 
Consistent with the apparent emphasis on indigenous development, none of the Chinese competition 
authorities is a member of the International Competition Network, a broad-based transnational forum 
for exchange of antitrust best practices and model rules. China is, however, a founding member of the 
BRICS competition forum, as well as of APEC, which has its own Competition Policy and Law Group. 
 7.  Cf. William Kovacic & Marianela Lopez-Galdos, The Lifecycles of New Competition Agencies: 
Explaining Variation in Successful Implementation of New Competition Regimes, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 115–16. 
 8.  In 2008, the AML’s first year, the Ministry of Commerce reviewed 17 mergers, of which 1 was 
approved conditionally. In 2009, the Ministry reviewed 77 mergers, of which 4 were approved 
conditionally and 1 blocked, with the number steadily increasing to 314 reviewed mergers in 2015 (2 
approved conditionally). In total, the Ministry had reviewed 1456 mergers by mid-2016, blocking 2 and 
approving 26 more conditionally. While its enforcement ramped up gradually, by September 2014, the 
National Development and Reformed Commission was investigating 335 companies, making 29 violation 
findings in 2013, 13 in 2014, and 8 in 2015. The State Administration of Industry and Commerce opened 
39 investigations by September 2014, and made 12 violation findings in 2013, 8 in 2014, and 14 in 2015. 
Data compiled based on announcements from the authorities’ websites: Anti-monopoly Bureau, Ministry 
of Commerce of the People’s Republic of China, http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn [https://perma.cc/43WQ-
NYQV]; Price Supervision & Anti-Monopoly Bureau, Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, 
http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn [https://perma.cc/HJX4-KHJW]; and the Anti-monopoly & Anti-unfair 
Competition Enforcement Bureau, State Admin. of Indus. & Commerce, 
http://www.saic.gov.cn/fldyfbzdjz/ [https://perma.cc/5U9Y-MNRA].  
 9.  See generally Yong Huang, Pursuing the Second Best: The History, Momentum, and Remaining 
Issues of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 117 (2008) (examining the driving forces and 
controversies in the AML legislative process); Qianlan Wu, EU–China Competition Dialogue: A New 
Step in the Internationalisation of EU Competition Law?, 18 EUR. L.J. 461 (2012) (discussing the impact 
of EU engagement with the Chinese government agencies on the AML); Zhenguo Wu, Perspectives on 
the Chinese Anti-Monopoly Law, 75 ANTITRUST L.J. 73 (2008) (discussing the drafting and enactment of 
the AML).  
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and best practices has been of particular interest due to the resulting impact on 
international business compliance. 10  From the enforcement perspective, 
commentators have assessed Chinese practice by examining the outcomes and 
reasoning in antitrust decisions,11 as well as the evolution of the competition 
regime over its first decade. 12  Though some contributors suggest that AML 
enforcement is largely in line with international practice, many have also argued 
that it exhibits a number of country-specific concerns.13 These include political 
concerns, such as consolidating decisionmaking powers by the central 
government vis-à-vis the regions, 14  as well as economic concerns, such as 
balancing development needs and economic efficiency.15 Some have even argued 
that the AML has been abused as a competition instrument, by turning it into a 
protectionist tool to favor or shield domestic industry or local economic 
interests.16 
  
 
 10.  See generally Bush, supra note 5 (arguing that the AML text leaves room for different evolutions 
of Chinese antitrust); Britton Davis, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: Protectionism or a Great Leap 
Forward? 33 B.C. INT’L & COMP. L. REV. 305 (2010) (discussing the role that protectionism, public 
interest concerns, and the advancement of a socialist economy play in AML merger review); Susan Beth 
Farmer, The Impact of China’s Antitrust Law and Other Competition Policies on U.S. Companies, 23 
LOY. CONSUMER L. REV. 34 (2010) (suggesting a divergence of Chinese from U.S. antitrust practice due 
to political and historical factors peculiar to the development of the Chinese economy); Dan Wei, 
Antitrust in China: An Overview of Recent Implementation of Anti-Monopoly Law, 14 EUR. BUS. ORG. 
L. REV. 119 (2013) (describing China’s cautious and phased convergence with international antitrust 
practices to accommodate the needs of a growing transition economy); Dan Wei, China’s Anti-Monopoly 
Law and its Merger Enforcement: Convergence and Flexibility,14 J. INT’L ECON. L. 805 (2011).  
 11.  Fei Deng & Cunzhen Huang, A Five Year Review of Merger Enforcement in China, ANTITRUST 
SOURCE 21 (Oct. 2013); Angela Huyue Zhang, Problems in Following EU Competition Law: A Case 
Study of Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, 3 PEKING UNIV. J. LEGAL STUD. 96 (2011). 
 12.  See generally Liyang Hou, An Evaluation of the Enforcement of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law in 
2008–2013 (2013), http://ssrn.com/abstract=2292296 [https://perma.cc/W7HL-RF8V] (discussing public 
dissatisfaction with the AML’s enforcement); Xiaoye Wang & Adrian Emch, Five Years of 
Implementation of China’s Anti-Monopoly Law–Achievements and Challenges, 1 J. ANTITRUST 
ENFORCEMENT 247 (2013) (providing a general overview of achievements and challenges in AML 
enforcement); Angela H. Zhang, The Enforcement of the Anti-Monopoly Law in China: An Institutional 
Design Perspective, 56 ANTITRUST BULL. 630 (2011) (examining the tripartite enforcement structure and 
the concentration of authority in MOFCOM).  
 13.  See Xinzhu Zhang & Vanessa Yanhua Zhang, Chinese Merger Control: Patterns and 
Implications, 6 J. COMPETITION L. & ECON. 477, 496 (2010) (discussing the enforcement and policy 
implications of three key merger cases). 
 14.  Eric C. Ip & Michael K. H. Law, Decentralization, Agency Costs, and the New Economic 
Constitution of China, 22 CONST. POL. ECON. 355 (2011).  
 15.  Wei, Convegence and Flexibility, supra note 10, at 842.  
 16.  See Steven Van Uytsel, China’s Antimonopoly Law and Its Recurrence to Standards: Economic 
Development or Rent-Seeking?, in LAW AND DEVELOPMENT IN ASIA 241–275 (Gerard Paul McAlinn & 
Caslav Pejovic eds., 2012); Eva Choi, Seeking Stones in the Red River: The Inevitable Evolution of China’s 
Anti Monopoly Law, 7 J.L. ECON. & POL’Y 163, 175 (2010); see also AmCham China, Competition Law, 
in 2015 AMERICAN BUSINESS IN CHINA WHITE PAPER (2015), 36–48, http://www.amcham 
china.org/policy-advocacy/white-paper/2015-american-business-in-china-white-paper 
[https://perma.cc/52DC-B9JV]. 
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Mixed reviews notwithstanding, the adoption of competition law in the 
Chinese context over its first six years may be regarded as an overall success.17 
Such an assessment may seem surprising given the AML’s short tenure, as well 
as China’s history of strong state intervention in the economy, its lack of 
experience with antitrust enforcement, and its gradualist and cautious adoption 
of competitive market principles. In seeking to provide an account of the reasons 
for the quick uptake, effectiveness, and success of Chinese competition 
enforcement, this article starts from the observation that legal transplants are 
more easily received in settings where there is demand (or need) for the 
transplanted rules by local actors.18 Such local demand allows for the transplant 
to be adapted to local circumstances, problems, and policy needs in the process 
of reception.19 The transplant can be adapted through the legislative process, so 
that local needs are reflected in an exercise of informed choice in selecting the 
rules.20 The familiarity of local actors, such as administrators, judges, or private 
parties, with the principles of the transplanted law is also said to favor its effective 
enforcement.21 
The existing literature has examined the legislative process of the AML, its 
enforcement structure, and the role of responsible bureaucratic and judicial 
actors. This contribution seeks to go further. Our goal is to examine the 
interactions between the competition authorities and the commercial and civil 
society stakeholders affected by investigated transactions or conduct. This is an 
important aspect of the successful domestication of competition law, particularly 
in the early stages of a competition regime, when there is considerable 
uncertainty about the appropriate role of competition law, the meaning of the 
legal norms, and the consequences of specific enforcement actions. In China, such 
uncertainty was heightened by the fact that the AML was enacted as part of an 
intense, longer-term debate about the evolution of economic policy focusing on 
questions about the pattern and sources of future growth, the restructuring of 
  
  
 
 17.  See Andrew W. Eichner, Battling Cartels in the New Era of Chinese Antitrust Enforcement, 47 
TEXAS INT’L L.J. 587, 616 (2012) (“China has made undeniably impressive progress in the . . . effort to 
develop an effective antitrust system”); Hannah C. L. Ha & John M. Hickin, China: Merger Control, 
GLOBAL COMPETITION REVIEW: THE ASIA-PACIFIC ANTITRUST REVIEW 2016 (2016), 
http://globalcompetitionreview.com/reviews/78/sections/294/chapters/3156/ [https://perma.cc/XQ9Z-
VEJE] (“MOFCOM is making significant strides towards becoming a world class competition 
authority”). 
 18.  See Daniel Berkowitz, Katharina Pistor & Jean-Francois Richard, Economic Development, 
Legality, and the Transplant Effect, 47 EUR. ECON. REV. 165, 167 (2003).  
 19.  Id. 
 20.  Id. at 176. 
 21.  Id. at 180. 
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industry (including the role of State Owned Enterprises (SOEs)22), and the forms 
of beneficial interaction with the world economy. 
This article studies three cases considered by the responsible authorities 
during or immediately following the AML legislative process and aims to show 
that in the face of uncertainty and absent well-defined policy preferences, the 
relevant authorities were open to input from various stakeholders. The 
reconstruction of the decisionmaking processes suggests that the shaping of 
competition policy in China has been subject to considerable contestation. 
Though both political and public opinion pressures existed for the authorities to 
use competition law as a protectionist tool, there were also countervailing policy 
considerations, including the importance of China’s integration in the global 
economy as a source of economic development and prosperity. 
One result of such contestation is that competition law enforcement in China 
may be far more politicized in that it is more openly sensitive to a broader set of 
policy goals than are the legal and technocratic antitrust templates of mature 
jurisdictions. 23  Consequently, criteria such as efficiency, short-run consumer 
prices, business autonomy, or market concentration are not singular touchstones 
for Chinese competition enforcement. Nor are other reductionist explanations 
such as industry policy, protectionism, or “economic patriotism.”24 This article 
argues that in the transition cases presented in part III, the relevant authorities 
regarded competition—and competition policy—as instruments for pursuing 
various policy objectives, without necessarily according them any primacy,25 thus 
adopting a flexible balancing approach to deciding competition cases. 
This open-search approach to consultation and decisionmaking through 
balancing policy considerations offers a number of advantages for enlivening a 
competition law transplant in a developing country. First, through such an 
approach, regulators can overcome political pressures that would either stymie 
competition law or seek to turn it into a protectionist instrument. Second, this 
approach enables the authorities to learn about relevant effects of competition 
decisions on development goals that they might overlook if simply following 
foreign templates or best practices. Third, even in a country such as China where 
a pre-existing authority is charged with competition enforcement, a broader 
 
 22.  SOEs in China are business entities established by central and local governments with 
supervisory officials from the government. They are either wholly state-funded or their majority share is 
owned by central or local governments. Apart from being business entities, often transformed to modern 
corporations during China’s gradual economic transition, SOEs also function as stabilizers to mitigate 
adverse effects from economic and social reform. See State Owned Enterprises in China: Reviewing the 
Evidence, OECD WORKING GROUP ON PRIVATISATION AND CORPORATE GOVERNANCE OF STATE 
OWNED ASSETS (Jan. 2009). 
 23.  See Eleanor M. Fox, Competition Policy: The Comparative Advantage of Developing Countries, 
79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 71–73, for a similar argument. 
 24.  Nathan Bush, Constraints on Convergence in Chinese Antitrust, 54 ANTITRUST BULL. 87, 96 
(2009); see also Ping Lin & Jingjing Zhao, Merger Control Policy Under China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 41 
REV. IND. ORGAN. 109, 111 (2012).  
 25.  See, e.g., Giorgio Monti, Article 81 EC and Public Policy, 39 COMMON MKT. L. REV. 1057 (2002) 
(suggesting a hierarchy between competition and other public policy objectives in EU enforcement).  
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conception of competition policy can sensitize the enforcer to how competitive 
rivalry affects its prior policy mandates and how competition law interacts with 
existing policy instruments. Finally, openings for consultation together with a 
conception of competition law as an instrument to pursue various policy 
objectives can provide triggers for stakeholders to invoke the law and build 
coalitions to affect decisionmaking. Such processes result in “local ownership” 
that can both enliven the legal transplant and contribute towards broader legal 
or institutional reform.26 
II 
DOMESTICATING COMPETITION LAW IN CHINA 
This part reviews the three key stages of domesticating competition law in 
China: the legislative process; the selection of the enforcement structure; and 
specific cases of implementation, and what they show about the local demand for 
competition law. The legislative text of the AML does not preordain a specific 
type of competition instrument, which leaves the enforcement authorities 
considerable discretion to shape China’s competition policy. The open texture of 
the law, as well as considerable uncertainty about the role of competition—and 
competition law—in ensuring continued growth and development and 
restructuring the Chinese economy create opportunities for market stakeholders 
to mold competition enforcement with their own demands. Arguably, this has 
allowed for a problem-solving, rather than legal or technocratic, evolution of 
Chinese competition policy. 
A. Legislative Process And Policy Sequencing 
Two factors suggest that the legislative process for the AML involved an 
exercise of informed choice manifesting local demand for competition law.27 
First, the AML went through a relatively long legislative process, with original 
discussions about a competition instrument in China dating back to 1987. 28 
Second, the AML text was not a cut-and-paste of an existing template. Instead, 
the AML reflects a deliberate selection of rules from different jurisdictions, 
including provisions addressed to concrete Chinese problems and policy 
concerns.29 The conclusion of local legislative tailoring is strengthened by the fact 
that China—unlike some transition economies—did not adopt its competition 
law as part of a big-bang market liberalization. Instead, China has been regarded 
as a successful example of gradualist economic reform attuned to rational policy 
 
 26.  See Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Toward an Institutional Approach to Comparative 
Economic Law?, in NEW DIRECTIONS IN COMPARATIVE LAW 213, 231 (A. Bakardjieva Engelbrekt & 
J. Nergelius eds., 2009). 
 27.  See Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 18. 
 28.  See Xiaofei Mao & Jian Hu, Fanlongduan Lifa de Huigu yu Zhanwang (反垄断立法的回顾与展
望 ) [Review and Prospect of the Legislation of Anti-Monopoly Law], 57 J. OF E. CHINA U. OF POL. SCI. 
& L. 121, 122 (2008).  
 29.  See, e.g., AML, supra note 1, at arts. 7–10. 
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sequencing,30 and China’s relatively late adoption of competition law fits this 
larger pattern. Debates at the highest levels reflected concerns about the 
premature introduction of competition law that might disrupt the achievement of 
overarching policy goals, such as economic development and industrial 
restructuring.31 
Two accounts of the appropriate sequencing of competition policy could have 
influenced the Chinese leadership to finally enact the AML. One comes from the 
view of development economists, such as Singh, who argued against premature 
adoption of efficiency or consumer-oriented antitrust in developing nations.32 
Such antitrust enforcement was said to impair achievement of developmental 
goals by reducing the flexibility to implement policies that support 
industrialization and growth.33 Following this reasoning, China could have opted 
for a consumer-oriented competition instrument, once developmental goals were 
largely achieved. An alternative view is that the AML was passed because 
policymakers required a neutral market regulation cover for industry policy 
decisions, particularly once the pursuit of nakedly protectionist policies was 
restricted by China’s accession to the World Trade Organization.34 
Despite the long gestation and textual tailoring, the AML’s definitions of 
objectives and specific violations are couched in relatively general and imprecise 
terms that encompass various conflicting views about the proper role of 
competition law expressed in governmental and academic circles.35 As a result, 
the AML lists a wide range of legislative objectives ranging from enhancing 
efficiency and consumer interests, to safeguarding the “social public interest” and 
the “healthy development of the socialist market economy.”36 Through the AML, 
the State should aim to “advance a unified, open, competitive and orderly market 
system,” as well as—more unusually—to “perfect” macroeconomic control. 37 
Substantively, apart from standard violation provisions—for example price fixing 
or dominance abuse—as well as provisions applying competitive principles to 
 
 30.  GÉRARD ROLAND, TRANSITION AND ECONOMICS: POLITICS, MARKETS, AND FIRMS 4–5 
(2000). 
 31.  Huang, supra note 9, at 118; Xiaoye Wang, Issues Surrounding the Drafting of China’s Anti-
Monopoly Law, 285 WASH. UNIV. GLOB. STUD. L. REV. 285, 292 (2004) (noting different views about 
the necessity of an anti-monopoly law in China). 
 32.   See Ajit Singh, Multilateral Competition Policy and Economic Development: A Developing 
Country Perspective on the European Community Proposals 12 (Paper presented at the fifth session of 
the Intergovernmental Group of Experts on Competition Law and Policy, Geneva, July 2–4, 2003), 
http://ideaswebsite.org/pdfs/mcp.pdf [https://perma.cc/5QTD-89UL] (using the policy sequencing of the 
East Asian tiger economies as an example). Singh’s argument was influential in generating opposition 
from developing countries to EU proposals for an international antitrust instrument in the 1990s and 
reflects the concerns expressed in A.E. Rodriguez & Ashok Menon, The Causes of Competition Agency 
Ineffectiveness in Developing Countries, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 61–63. 
 33.  Singh, supra note 32. 
 34.  See Bush, supra note 24, at 90.  
 35.  See Bush, supra note 24, at 93–97 (exploring the contrasting views of antitrust-savvy officials and 
others who view competition policy as an “instrument of industrial policy”).  
 36.  AML, supra note 1, at art. 1. 
 37.  AML, supra note 1, at art. 4. 
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administrative monopolies, the AML also includes provisions that are not 
susceptible to standard antitrust analytical categories.38 
The wide range of enumerated objectives and substantive provisions, as well 
as the reliance on open-textured standards rather than black-letter rules, 39 
suggest that the AML text is unlikely to guide or constrain the responsible 
decisionmakers. The residual discretion can be filled through some combination 
of top-down policy preferences and bottom-up input from relevant actors and 
stakeholders. Bush, for example, has argued that the AML text leaves room for 
Chinese antitrust either to converge to prevailing international practice or to 
serve strategic industrial policy goals. 40  Yet the early enforcement pattern 
disclosed in the case studies suggests that Chinese competition policy followed 
neither of these paths, which this article argues is one of the reasons for its 
success. 
B. Enforcement Structure 
Because the AML text leaves large discretion to the implementing 
institutions, the literature also focuses on the law’s enforcement structure.41 Here 
again, China did not follow the precedent of mature jurisdictions and establish a 
new, dedicated, and independent competition authority. Instead, the Chinese 
State Council divided AML enforcement responsibilities among three existing 
ministries with prior mandates similar in nature to different components of 
competition law. 42  The Ministry of Commerce (MOFCOM), already China’s 
foreign investment watchdog, leads merger review. The National Development 
and Reform Commission (NDRC), historically a powerful macroeconomic and 
industrial policy central planning body43 (which also acted as a price regulator 
under the Price Law44), has responsibility for all price-related AML violations, 
such as price-fixing cartels or other anti-competitive conduct affecting prices. 
Finally, the State Administration of Industry and Commerce (SAIC), responsible 
for the older Anti-Unfair Competition Law, enforces all non-price related AML 
 
 38.  See, e.g., AML, supra note 1, at art. 7 (“protect[ing]” State-owned economic operators that 
constitute the “lifeline of national economy and national security”); see also id. at art. 31 (providing for 
national security examination in merger reviews). 
 39.  See Angela Huyue Zhang, Bureaucratic Politics and China’s Anti-Monopoly Law, 47 CORNELL 
INT’L L. J. 671, 676–677 (2014). As Zhang points out, the imprecision in the AML rules is not peculiar to 
China, given that a market regulation tool—such as antitrust—requires fact-specific decisionmaking 
sensitive to the effects of reviewed conduct and transactions. 
 40.  See Bush, supra note 5. 
 41.  See generally, Zhang, supra note 39. 
 42.  See AML, supra note 1, at art. 10 (providing that “the [AML] enforcement agency designated 
by the State Council . . . shall be responsible for the [AML] enforcement work,” but not specifying the 
responsible institution). 
 43.  Bush, supra note 24, at 103.  
 44.  Pricing Law of the People’s Republic of China, Adopted at the 29th Meeting of the Standing 
Committee of the Eighth National People’s Congress on Dec. 29, 1997, promulgated by Order No. 92 of 
the President of the People’s Republic of China on Dec. 29, 1997, http://www.npc.gov.cn/ 
englishnpc/Law/2007-12/11/content_1383577.htm [https://perma.cc/5YEL-WTWN].  
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violations, such as market sharing agreements, industry association rules, and 
anti-competitive abuses of administrative power. The AML also provides for a 
second tier in the enforcement structure, made up of the new Anti-Monopoly 
Commission (AMC). The AMC operates directly under the State Council (the 
apex decisionmaker) and is composed of the heads of a number of ministries and 
departments, including the Ministry of Industry and Information Technology. It 
establishes general policy guidelines and coordinates the activities of the three 
enforcement agencies, without having any formal decisionmaking or review 
powers in individual cases. 
In addition to these ministerial authorities, the Chinese judiciary has a formal 
role in AML enforcement through judicial review of administrative decisions and 
civil antitrust actions, for which the Supreme People’s Court has recently 
elaborated specific procedural rules. 45  In practice, however, the role of the 
judiciary is quite limited. Zhang shows that even directly addressed or affected 
parties rarely seek judicial review of administrative decisions.46 Further, though 
a number of private antitrust enforcement actions have been commenced before 
the courts, they have been largely unsuccessful. 47  Particularly in light of the 
limited role of the judiciary in reviewing authority decisions, Zhang suggests that 
a legal evolution—stabilizing the interpretation of the AML through judicial 
decisions and precedents—is unlikely.48 This leaves the main role in elaborating 
competition law to the responsible ministerial authorities. 
China’s decision to place competition enforcement in the hands of existing 
ministerial authorities instead of a dedicated independent authority has been 
criticized, 49  even if it does offer some advantages. First, it prevents delayed 
enforcement by alleviating the resource and staff constraints that a wholly new 
agency would face immediately after it is established.50 Existing authorities can 
use already established mechanisms for monitoring markets and disciplining 
companies to enforce the new law. Second, the local authorities’ familiarity with 
the underlying principles of a transplanted law may facilitate effective 
enforcement. 51  Third, the existing ministerial authorities are already well-
 
 45.  [Provisions on Several Issues Concerning the Application of Law in the Trial of Civil Dispute 
Cases Arising from Monopolistic Conduct] (promulgated by the Sup. People’s Ct., Jan. 30, 2012, effective 
June 1, 2012), http://www.lawinfochina.com/display.aspx?id=9300&lib=law&SearchKeyword 
=Application%20of%20Law%20in%20the%20Trial%20of%20Civil%20Dispute%20Cases&SearchC
Keyword=&EncodingName=big5 [https://perma.cc/9WD7-JX6F]. 
 46.  Zhang, supra note 39, at 679. 
 47.  See Zhang, supra note 39, at 679 (suggesting that out of 100 civil actions filed under the AML, 
plaintiffs have won in only 2 cases).  
 48.  Id. at 680. 
 49.  Wang & Emch, supra note 12, at 267–68, suggest that early Chinese decisions reflected the lack 
of experience, resources, and autonomy of the competition enforcers, leading to an incorrect 
understanding of principles underlying foreign competition templates; see also Zhang, supra note 39, at 
707. 
 50.  See Umut Aydin & Tim Büthe, Competition Law & Policy in Developing Countries: Explaining 
Variations in Outcomes; Exploring Possibilities and Limits, 79 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS., no. 4, 2016, at 
15–16.  
 51.  See, Berkowitz, Pistor & Richard, supra note 18. In China, MOFCOM already performed some 
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embedded in the political system and have channels of communication with 
industry and other market stakeholders, including foreign companies. Therefore, 
they may be seen as powerful and credible regulators.52 
At the same time, placing enforcement responsibility for a transplanted law 
in the hands of regulators with similar prior mandates also carries several risks. 
Weaknesses in the pre-existing enforcement structures will hamper the 
implementation efficacy of the transplanted law.53 Even absent such weaknesses, 
pre-existing regulators may continue to follow the rules, policy goals, or 
decisionmaking routines under their former mandate, without adjusting to the 
novel goals or market discipline instruments introduced by the transplanted law.54 
Zhang has forcefully argued that understanding Chinese case law outcomes 
requires an examination of the bureaucratic structure of antitrust 
decisionmaking, including the policy processes, incentives, and constraints of the 
relevant enforcement agencies.55 In the absence of textual constraint or judicial 
oversight, she suggests that competition decisions reflect an authority’s 
assessment of the ultimate effects of the conduct under scrutiny and its 
understanding of the proper antitrust goals.56 As a result, she agrees that case 
outcomes cannot be explained by a single factor, such as efficiency or 
protectionist industry policy.57 Instead, they reflect the institutional dynamics of 
bureaucratic politics, including the decentralized delegation of enforcement 
responsibilities to multiple actors that have their own policy processes, incentives, 
and lines of consultation. 58  Thus, Zhang argues that “Chinese enforcement 
outcomes largely result from a struggle among government agencies which decide 
antitrust issues in terms of the personal consequence for their stature and 
power.”59 In the inter-agency consultation process, each agency evaluates the 
costs and benefits of the decision in terms of its own interests and policy 
objectives and each case requires a complex bargaining process to “hammer out 
a workable solution” satisfactory to all relevant agencies.60 
  
 
form of merger review in foreign investment cases, while the NDRC was responsible for price 
manipulation.  
 52.  Aydin & Büthe, supra note 50, at 29–32 (discussing importance of embedded autonomy). 
 53.  See Wang & Emch, supra note 12, at 271 (noting reasons for enforcement weaknesses).  
 54.  This is a particular concern when shifting from planning and centralized surveillance to 
competitive rivalry and consumer choice as the forces that discipline industry. Marco Botta & Alexander 
Svetlicnii, Article 102 TFEU as a Tool of Market Regulation: Excessive Enforcement Against Excessive 
Pricing in the new EU Member States and Candidate Countries, 8 EUR. COMPETITION J. 473 (discussing 
use of competition law for price regulation in transition economies); see also Yane Svetiev, How 
Consumer Law Travels 23 J. CONSUMER POL’Y 209, 224–25 (2013) (describing problems with existing 
institutions enforcing transplanted consumer law).  
 55.  Zhang, supra note 39, at 674. 
 56.  Id. at 676–77.  
 57.  Id. at 674,   
 58.  Id. at 673, 702. 
 59.  Id. at 674. 
 60.  Id. 
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Two corollaries follow from the foregoing analysis. First, Zhang suggests that 
Chinese competition enforcement is a highly “centralized process.”61 Second, 
given that authorities with pre-existing responsibilities play the main role in both 
goal-setting and decisionmaking, non-competition related considerations seep in 
from the enforcement agencies’ prior policy mandates, such as industrial and 
commercial policy for MOFCOM, 62  or macro price stability and industry 
planning for the NDRC.63 Such muddling of goals, she argues, both diminishes 
competition law as a market discipline tool and weakens the efficacy of its 
enforcement.64 
C. Enforcement: Consultation And Input 
As Aydin and Büthe argue, however, whatever its formal degree of 
independence, no competition authority can operate in a vacuum: effective 
enforcement requires communication with the general public 65  as well as 
consultation with affected stakeholders. While Zhang describes antitrust 
decisionmaking as a “highly pluralistic process,” the focus of her analysis is 
consultation between central government and local officials.66 Yet even assuming 
that the responsible officials are focused on “personal consequences for their 
stature and power”67 and influenced by prior policy mandates, they would still 
need to consult with market stakeholders, including industry participants, 
suppliers, retailers, customers, or workers so as to set enforcement priorities and 
understand the likely effects of their decisions. 
In investigating the decisionmaking processes this article aims to go beyond 
the focus on authorities and inter-authority dialogue, and to examine the interests 
and pressures that come to bear on the enforcement agencies from outside the 
bureaucracy. Such an investigation reveals that uncertainty about how to enliven 
the competition mandate and about its interaction with prior policy mandates, 
led the agencies to seek considerable input from relevant industry and market 
stakeholders, who in turn sought to create new openings for input. This insight 
softens descriptions of Chinese enforcement as a centralized process. Although 
stakeholder input is not always reflected in the final decisions, it brings forth 
arguments that influence the decisionmaking process and the contours of Chinese 
competition policy. Whatever its immediate impact on decisions, such bottom-up 
input creates pressure for further enforcement efforts by building constituencies 
that view the AML as a helpful tool to pursue their goals. Such constituencies, in 
turn, enhance the autonomy of the authorities vis-à-vis each other and the 
political leadership in the exercise of their competition mandate. 
 
 61.  Id. at 706. 
 62.  Id. at 706. 
 63.  Id. at 693, 698–99. 
 64.  Id. at 706–07 (suggesting strengthening of judicial oversight to cure these problems). 
 65.  Aydin & Büthe, supra note 50, at 11–12 (discussing goal of fostering a culture of competition). 
 66.  Zhang, supra note 39, at 705. 
 67.  Id. at 675. 
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III 
THE EARLY ENFORCEMENT PRACTICE: THREE CASE STUDIES 
A. Methodology 
To investigate the domestication of competition policy through the process of 
implementation, this part presents in-depth case studies of the decisionmaking 
processes in three “transition” cases, decided by the relevant authorities in the 
lead up to or shortly after the promulgation of the AML. The aim is to compare 
the apparent policy needs and mandates of the authorities to how relevant 
industry stakeholders viewed the need for and utility of a competition law 
instrument. At the time of making these decisions, the studied authorities 
(MOFCOM and the NDRC) were unencumbered by stable antitrust practices 
and analytical categories.68  This provided them with some freedom to either 
employ prior decisionmaking tools or to experiment with different approaches 
and arguments in analyzing and remedying anti-competitive conduct, while also 
being subject to various political and interest group pressures from above and 
below. 
Notably all three cases involved foreign firms who were either seeking to 
acquire local target companies or were accused of anti-competitive conduct with 
local effects. Commentators have argued that the early decisions were 
particularly animated by protectionist industrial policy. 69  In light of such 
criticisms, two further objectives are to investigate the extent to which the 
authorities approached the cases with protectionist motives and whether 
stakeholders placed evidence and arguments before the authorities that could 
support a development-sensitive competition policy that is not necessarily 
protectionist. 
The reconstruction of the decisionmaking processes goes beyond the 
published opinions and official statements of the authorities. It is based on 
contemporaneous legal and economic commentary by members of the business 
and legal communities, as well as materials produced by the stakeholders in these 
cases.70 Specifically, the case studies were guided by three key questions: 
What procedures do the relevant authorities use to acquire information and 
from whom do they obtain input as the basis for their decisions? 
To what extent does the information acquired relate to consumer effects and 
efficiency as opposed to broader goals (related to economic development and 
 
 68.  Two of the cases could not formally be decided under the AML because the conduct took place 
prior to its enactment.  
 69.  E.g., Lin & Zhao, supra note 24, at 111–12 (arguing that the analyses of the Carlyle/Xugong and 
Coca-Cola/Huiyuan mergers were informed by protectionism and economic patriotism even if the 
authorities have departed from such an approach since). As such, there is no claim that the cases selected 
are representative of Chinese enforcement either generally or at the present time, though they may be 
regarded as difficult cases. 
 70.  Such a descriptive focus on decisionmaking processes has not been typically applied to China’s 
competition practice, but it is essential particularly for new adopters where the final decisions do not 
disclose the full record, as well as the authority’s weighing of different arguments presented. 
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restructuring, industrial policy, or the interests of other stakeholders) and how 
are such goals balanced procedurally and substantively? 
In what ways are the procedures for acquiring information, decisionmaking, 
or balancing policy considerations formalized so as to make them tractable for 
companies subject to the AML, while also constraining the authorities’ future 
decisionmaking and enabling them to learn from prior interventions? 
B. Carlyle/Xugong 
1. Background and Facts 
In October 2005, the U.S. private equity firm, the Carlyle Group agreed to 
pay $375 million for eighty-five percent of Xugong Group Construction 
Machinery. At the time, this was the biggest proposed foreign acquisition of a 
controlling stake in a leading SOE. 71  Xugong specialized in construction 
equipment, including excavators, loaders, cranes, compactors, and shovels, and 
had been the market leader in China’s machinery sector. However, Xugong was 
not particularly profitable, had a heavy pension burden for retired employees, 
and a large percentage of its assets were bank loans.72 It also faced competition 
from domestic privately owned firms and foreign multinationals, such as Volvo 
and Caterpillar. 
Because this was a proposed SOE acquisition by a foreign entity, both 
MOFCOM and NDRC approval were potentially required.73 Prior to the AML, 
MOFCOM was responsible for overseeing foreign investments in domestic 
companies. The NDRC, as the principal economic planning body, oversaw key 
national strategic manufacturing sectors and the restructuring of SOEs. Xugong 
was a municipal level enterprise, subject to oversight by the municipal 
authorities, though, given the case’s sensitivity, they sought guidance from 
national institutions like the NDRC. While the proposal was under scrutiny, it 
was rumored that Xugong was included on the NDRC’s list of key equipment 
manufacturing companies whose restructuring process required close review,74 
making the NDRC another potentially concerned regulator even absent a clear 
formal mandate. 
Uncertainty about which body would review the proposed acquisition and on 
what basis highlighted the need for a merger approval instrument in China, 
particularly for transactions in which foreign capital targeted key Chinese 
 
 71.  Dan Slater, Carlyle Group Buys Chinese SOE, FINANCE ASIA (Oct. 25, 2005), 
http://www.financeasia.com/News/30144,carlyle-group-buys-chinese-soe.aspx [https://perma.cc/S792-
ZR8Z]. Xugong was controlled by Xuzhou Construction Machinery Group, which is owned by the 
Xuzhou Municipal government.  
 72.  See Xugong Yiyun (徐工疑云) [Mysteries of Xugong], 环球企业家 [GLOBAL ENTREPRENEUR 
MAGAZINE], http://www.gemag.com.cn/8/8022_1.html [https://perma.cc/MP2J-XR72]. 
 73.  Kailei Touzi Rugu Xugong Jituan Gaochui (凯雷投资入股徐工集团告吹) [Carlyle Group 
Investment in Xugong Falls Through], SINA CAIJING [SINA FINANCE] (July 24, 2008), 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/b/20080724/09565127210.shtml [https://perma.cc/56KR-F5KE].  
 74.  Id.  
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sectoral players. In fact, the case is regarded as a tipping point that accelerated 
the AML legislative process.75 Practitioner commentary suggests that, apart from 
the foreign ownership of strategic assets, the acquisition raised market power 
concerns and the question about the legal treatment of cases involving 
competition issues. 76  Li Deshui, a member of the Chinese People’s Political 
Consultative Congress77 and a champion of national economic security,78 made 
an explicit link between this case and the enactment of an anti-monopoly law.79 
Thus, in June 2006, during the Xugong acquisition discussions and after having 
had a draft text in its hands for two years, the State Council submitted its own 
version to the top legislator, the National People’s Congress. In finally passing 
the law, the legislator inserted Article Seven, dealing with SOEs that are of 
significant importance to the national economy and national security.80 
 
 75.  See Liaowang Wenzhang: Fanlongduanfa Chutai Rengyou Sanda Nandian Xu Pojie (《瞭望》文
章：反垄断法出台仍有三大难点须破解) [Article from Liaowang: Three Key Challenges to be Tackled 
Before Anti-Monopoly Law Enactment], GX LAW, http://www.gx-law.gov.cn/a2/4543.jhtml 
[https://perma.cc/9EJS-F7J2]. The deal was announced in October 2005 and was abandoned by July of 
2008. The AML was enacted in October of 2007 and effective from August 1, 2008. The fact that the 
review process for the merger was largely coterminous with the AML enactment suggests that it is 
informative about the policy needs and the perceptions of stakeholders about the objects of a merger 
review instrument. 
 76.  Chen Shiju & Long Xiaoli, On the Reconstruction of China’s Foreign Investment Law: With Some 
Comments on the Carlyle/Xugong Merger Case, LAWTIME LAWYER (Sept. 3, 2012), 
http://www.lawtime.cn/article/lll103896867103901961oo133917 [https://perma.cc/2GF4-EKZ6].  
 77.  The Chinese People’s Political Consultative Conference is a political advisory body with 
delegates from the Communist Party, the United Front parties allied with the Communist Party and 
independent delegates who are not members of any party. Its National Committee holds its annual 
meeting at the same time as plenary sessions of the top legislator, the National People’s Congress, 
http://www.cppcc.gov.cn/zxww/zxyw/Brief/index.shtml [https://perma.cc/PQZ9-4SN5]. 
 78.  See Kekoukele Shougou Huiyuan Bei Fou De Muhou Boyi [Games Behind the Scenes: Coca-
Cola’s Failed Acquisition of Huiyuan], FENGHUANGCHENG [PHOENIX NEWS] (March 25, 2009), 
http://finance.ifeng.com/roll/20090325/480618.shtml [https://perma.cc/Q6GL-7HDE] (Deshui is regarded 
as the “father of the [national] economic security” concept.). 
 79.  See Shangwubu Qiantou Tingzheng Xugong San Tian Lian Yu Shu Shi Wen (商务部牵头”听证” 
徐工三天连遇数十问) [MOFCOM Leading the Hearing and Xugong Inquired by Dozens of Questions in 
Three Days], XINHUA NEWS (July 28, 2006, 8:17 PM), http://news.xinhuanet.com/fortune/2006-
07/28/content_4886452.htm [https://perma.cc/V76M-QLPQ]; Kailei Konggu Xugong Zaisheng Bianshu 
Zhongguo Yushe Waizi Binggou Honglvdeng Monopoly (凯雷控股徐工再生变数 中国预设外资并购红
绿灯) [Carlyle Takeover of Xugong Becomes Uncertain China Planning Traffic Lights for Foreign 
Mergers], FINANCE SINA, (March 23, 2006), http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060323/09582441236.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/6VT5-GAZ8]; Daibiao Jianyi Jinzao Wancheng Fanlongduanfa Jinfang Longduanxing 
Waizi Binggou (代表建议尽早完成反垄断法 谨防垄断性外资并购) [Delegates Suggesting Immediate 
Enactment of Anti-Monopoly Law Against Monopoly from Foreign Takeovers], FINANCE SINA (Mar. 
12, 2006), http://finance.sina.com.cn/g/20060312/23302410092.shtml [https://perma.cc/NT4Y-R8Q8].  
 80.  Bush, supra note 24, at 113. AML, supra note 1, at art. 7 provides: “With respect to the industries 
controlled by the State-owned economy and concerning the lifeline of national economy and national 
security or the industries implementing exclusive operation and sales according to law, the state protects 
the lawful business operations conducted by the business operators therein.” 
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2. Pressures and Interests 
This merger fuelled existing widespread public concerns that China was 
selling strategic companies and successful local brands cheaply to foreign 
investors, creating pressure for the Chinese central authorities to block the deal. 
A key consideration in Carlyle/Xugong, like in the subsequent Huiyuan case, 
appeared to be the sensitivity of the central government and the relevant 
authorities to public opinion, as well as affected actors’ attempts to use public 
opinion to influence decisionmaking by exploiting the uncertainty faced by the 
authorities and the complex lines of bureaucratic consultation. Apart from 
domestic pressure, the authorities were also careful about the signals sent to 
foreign investors. Given local opposition, by July 2006, Carlyle itself lobbied 
MOFCOM and NDRC about the transactions through prominent members of its 
board, including founder David Rubinstein and former U.S. Secretary of State, 
Collin Powell.81 
Xugong’s municipal owner regarded the Carlyle acquisition as a key aspect 
of the company’s restructuring. 82  Xugong’s challenges were typical of many 
Chinese SOEs in the late 1990s and early 2000s and were attributed to the rigidity 
of public ownership.83 The Chinese government, at both national and local levels, 
encouraged SOEs to restructure, including through privatizing a share to external 
investors as a way of obtaining adequate operational capital.84 Foreign investors 
were often preferred over domestic ones for their more advanced management, 
potential to open up new markets, and possible technology transfers that could 
add value and boost under-performing SOEs. 
Xugong was already among the candidate companies for restructuring by the 
Jiangsu Provincial government in 2002. Its market leading position and the 
divestiture that helped shed its debts made Xugong attractive to investors. Both 
Xugong and its municipal owner did not choose Chinese local investors, rejecting 
an offer from Sany Corporation, a leading, privately owned equipment 
manufacturer and one of Xugong’s principal local competitors.85 Caterpillar’s 
offer was also rejected, apparently due to an unsuccessful earlier joint venture 
with Xugong in which only Caterpillar’s brand was used and which suffered losses 
leading to substantial employee layoffs. Carlyle won after several rounds of 
bidding,86 both because it was the highest bid and due to expectations that it was 
most likely to inject fresh blood into the SOE giant.87 Carlyle argued that its  
 
 
 81.  See Shangwubu, supra note 79.  
 82.  See Mysteries of Xugong, supra note 72.  
 83.  Id.  
 84.  Id.  
 85.  Id.  
 86.  See Jiema Xugong Binggouan Sanda Xuanyi, Xiang Wenbo Chengwei Zhongshi Zhidi (解码徐
工并购案三大悬疑 向文波成为众矢之的) [Unpack Three Key Mysteries in Xugong Merger Case: Xiang 
Wenbo Attracts Criticisms From All Directions], XINHUANNET NEWS (July 29, 2006),  
[https://perma.cc/H9BE-NRN2]. 
 87.  Id.  
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status as a financial entity made it a better buyer than foreign or local competitors 
precisely because it sought to maintain the existing local brand and know how.88 
Initially, the proposed acquisition proceeded smoothly. The agreement 
included a number of highly favorable provisions for Xugong’s owners. Carlyle 
signalled its long-term commitment to Xugong’s restructuring by limiting its 
ability to sell the shares of the new company for four years, as well as giving 
Xugong Group the priority to purchase the shares if the new company was listed 
on overseas markets.89 In April 2006, a provision limiting hostile takeovers was 
also inserted, restricting Xugong’s key local or foreign competitors from getting 
control of the new company.90 Notably, though the proposed acquisition did not 
involve horizontal competitors, this provision promoted competition policy 
goals, by ensuring that Xugong would remain an independent rival in the market, 
while also committing Carlyle to its restructuring. 
By June 2006, Xiang Wenbo, Sany’s executive president, began to publicly 
vent criticism against the proposal on his blog. He argued that the change of 
ownership of Xugong, as a key manufacturer in a strategic industrial sector, could 
impact national economic security.91 Xiang suggested that Carlyle’s offer was too 
low for premium state assets and that the Chinese government should screen such 
deals closely.92 He also criticized local governments for selling premium state 
assets to foreign investors, while rejecting offers from Chinese domestic 
investors.93 In the ensuing five months, Xiang published forty-six critical blog 
posts with arguments on the basis of foreign investment, national security, 
strategic industries, cross-border mergers, competition, and discrimination 
against Chinese private companies. 94  His postings ensured substantial media 
 
 88.  Id. 
 89.  See Meiguo Kailei Jituan Shougou Xugong Jituan Gongcheng Jixiee Youxian Gongsi Anquan 
Shencha Ji Waishang Touzi Xianzhi (美国凯雷集团收购徐工集团工程机械公司 安全审查及外商投资限
制) [Carlyle Xugong Merger: Security Review and Restrictions on Foreign Investment] GOOD LAWYER 
CHINA, (Nov. 5 2011), http://www.goodlawyerchina.com/Specialty/87/Info/1972.html [https://perma. 
cc/6L77-VLRE].  
 90.  See Xugong Gaoguan Dujia Jiemi: Weihe Jia Kailei er Ju Sanyi (徐工高管独家解密：为何嫁凯
雷 而 拒 三 一 ) [Top Executive of Xugong Reveals Why They Took Carlyle instead of Sany], 
http://finance.people.com.cn/GB/1039/4577894.html [https://perma.cc/5VF5-NXKD].  
 91.  See Wenbo Xiang, Sanyi Meiyuan (三一能否收购徐工? 三亿美元 三一能否收购徐工？) [Three 
Hundred Million US Dollars: Can Sanyi Take Over Xugong?], SINA BLOG (June 8, 2006), 
http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_487d2dfa010003pg.html [https://perma.cc/9UG5-YTED].  
 92.  See blogs of Wenbo Xiang, Xugong Binggou :Yige Meili De Huangyan! (徐工并购：一个美丽的
谎 言 ！ ) [Xugong Merger: A Beautiful Liar!], SINA BLOG (June 12, 2006), http://blog.sina. 
com.cn/s/blog_487d2dfa010003st.html [https://perma.cc/KGS5-98K9] and Xugong Buneng Bei Waizi 
Shougou De Sida Liyou (徐工不能被外资收购的四大理由)  [Four Reasons for Xugong not Being Taken-
over by Foreign Investor], (June 14, 2006), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/blog_487d2dfa010003tu.html 
[https://perma.cc/4Q9W-RNB2].  
 93.  See blog of Wenbo Xiang, Xugong Binggou An Zhong De Jiage Qipian  (徐工案中的价格欺骗) 
[Price Cheat in the Xugong Case], SINA BLOG (June 14, 2006), http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/ 
blog_487d2dfa010003tp.html [https://perma.cc/K6F2-5J7M].  
 94.  See Archive of Blog Posts by Xiang Wenbo between June and October 2016, SINA NEWS: blog 
posts in June 2006 can be accessed at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/article 
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focus on the takeover and stimulated debate about whether state-owned assets 
should be available for foreign investment. 
3. Formalizing Decisionmaking Procedures 
Given such public attention and the view that foreign investors are an 
important route for SOE restructuring, the Chinese central authorities were 
under pressure not to leave the deal completely in the hands of the Xuzhou 
municipal government.95 
The need for streamlining merger review was highlighted by doubts as to the 
responsible body and the basis for vetting the merger. MOFCOM, the State 
Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, and NDRC were all 
potentially responsible. A China Economic Weekly legal report suggested that all 
relevant bodies had to be notified of the agreement.96 It further asserted that 
prior approvals from the State Owned Assets Supervision and Administration 
Commission and NDRC were required before MOFCOM was approached for 
final approval.97 In fact, both MOFCOM and NDRC formalized regulations in an 
apparent attempt to claim a mandate in important merger cases and set out 
approval criteria related to their existing responsibilities. 
In February 2006, NDRC released Opinions of the State Council on 
Invigorating Equipment Manufacturing98 providing that, where a majority share 
of an equipment manufacturer of key sectoral importance is to be sold to foreign 
companies, the deal shall be scrutinized by the State Council, with NDRC 
producing the leading opinion. Beyond the somewhat vague triggers of “key 
importance” and “majority share,” the opinion did not provide criteria upon 
which the approval would be based.99 
MOFCOM promulgated Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of 
Domestic Enterprises by Foreign Investors in August, 2006, claiming a vetting 
 
_archive_1216163322_200606_1.html, in July 2006 at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/article_archive 
_1216163322_200607_1.html, in August 2016 at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/article_archive_1216163322 
_200608_1.html, in September 2006 at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/article_archive_ \1216163322 
_200609_1.html, and in October 2006 at http://blog.sina.com.cn/s/article_archive_1216163322_ 
200610_1.html.  
 95.  This is not to say that there was agreement with Xiang’s largely self-serving arguments by either 
authority or government officials. The deal had many supporters who disagreed with Xiang’s arguments. 
Cf. infra note 206.  
 96.  Xugong An Jiutuo Weijue Yuanzi Bumen Yijian Buyi? (徐公案久拖未决 缘自部门意见不一？) 
[Prolonged Xugong Merger Approval Derived from Conflicting Opinions of Authorities?], CHINA 
ECONOMIC WEEKLY (Nov. 27, 2006), http://paper.people.com.cn/zgjjzk/html/2006-
11/27/content_12105041.htm [https://perma.cc/J4W8-PLZ9]. 
 97.  Id. An anonymous NDRC official was quoted complaining that the Carlyle/Xugong merger had 
only been directly notified to MOFCOM and that the NDRC was receiving information indirectly via 
MOFCOM or the political leadership.  
 98.  Guowuyuan Guanyu Jiakuai Zhenxing Zhuangbei Zhizaoye De Ruogan Yijian (国务院关于加
快振兴制造业的若干意见) [Opinions of the State Council on Invigorating Equipment Manufacturing], 
GOV’T OF CHINA (Feb. 23, 2006), http://www.gov.cn/gongbao/content/2006/content_352166.htm 
[https://perma.cc/59HV-7J2Q]. 
 99.  See id.  
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power over foreign acquisitions of domestic enterprises based on sectoral 
importance, national economic security and ownership of famous local brands.100 
Article 12 specifically provided: 
Where a foreign investor intends to obtain the actual controlling power of a domestic 
enterprise it plans to take over, and if any important industry is concerned, or if it has an 
impact on or may have an impact on the national economic security, or it will lead to the 
transfer of the actual controlling power of a domestic enterprise which holds a famous 
trademark or China Time-honored Brand, the parties concerned shall file an application 
with the MOFCOM.101 
Apart from a sign of competition among these authorities, such regulatory 
activity also demonstrated how intertwined merger review is with restructuring 
(or dynamic efficiency) objectives related to growth and development and to 
foreign investment. The State Council ultimately designated MOFCOM and 
NDRC as responsible authorities for the AML. Further, special criteria for SOEs 
of key economic and security importance together with a national security layer 
of review in cases of a proposed foreign takeover of a domestic enterprise were 
included in the AML.102 The inclusion of such provisions supported suspicions 
that the AML was enacted to give a neutral, technocratic cover for interventions 
motivated by concerns about foreign ownership of strategically important assets. 
However, despite such criticisms, the authorities’ analysis of the impact of the 
Carlyle/Xugong acquisition was based on more nuanced considerations than 
would be suggested by a straightforward account of favoring  “national 
champions.”103 
Stakeholder and public opinion pressures led the authorities to open 
procedures for the receipt of market input. In July 2006,104 MOFCOM, together 
with the State-Owned Assets Supervision and Administration Commission, 
invited various stakeholders to Beijing for a three-day fact-finding hearing.105 
One of these meetings involved Xugong, central government agencies, municipal 
and provincial government departments, and a member of the People’s 
Liberation Army—to confirm that Xugong did not produce any military 
 
 100.  See Interim Provisions on Mergers and Acquisitions of Domestic Enterprises by Foreign 
Investors, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA (Aug. 10, 2006), 
http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/Businessregulations/201303/20130300045825.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/K2DB-J3M8].  
 101.  Id. The article goes on to provide that “[i]f the parties concerned fail to do so, but its takeover 
has had or may have a serious impact on the national economic security, the MOFCOM may . . . demand 
the parties concerned to terminate the transaction or transfer the relevant equities/assets or take other 
effective measures to eliminate the takeover’s impact on the national economic security.” Id.  
 102.  AML, supra note 1, at art. 31, provides: “Where a foreign investor merges and acquires a 
domestic enterprise or participate in concentration by other means, if state security is involved, besides 
the examination on the concentration in accordance with this Law, the examination on national security 
shall also be conducted in accordance with the relevant State provisions.”  
 103.  Cf. D. Daniel Sokol, Tensions Between Antitrust and Industrial Policy, 22 GEO. MASON L. REV. 
1247, 1247 (2015) (“industrial policy promotes government intervention for privileged groups or 
industries”). 
 104.  Thus, this occurred shortly after Sany’s Xiang began posting against the acquisition on his blog.  
 105.  See Shangwubu, supra note 79.  
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equipment.106  But consultation was not limited to the bureaucracy: a further 
meeting was held with sectoral participants, including other manufacturers, 
dealers, upstream firms, the engineering equipment association and the 
machinery industry association.107 Most participants in the second meeting were 
state-owned manufacturers, but private firms were also present, including Sany. 
This was the first time a central authority held a hearing on a business merger 
case.108 The hearing was held for information-gathering purposes, but it led to the 
conclusion that the acquisition plan by Carlyle needed revision.109 
Because these hearings were not public, it is not possible to say what kinds of 
arguments and evidence were presented, or the way in which considerations 
related to competition, state asset restructuring, industry development, or other 
goals were weighed. From a competition standpoint, it is notable that key 
competitors of Xugong, including Sany, were invited and provided input at the 
meeting.110 In a subsequent interview, Xugong’s CEO reported that, from among 
the various authorities and firms present, only Sany opposed the merger.111 He 
also indicated that, despite the general support expressed for the merger, Carlyle, 
having obtained a better understanding of the landscape after the hearing, 
considered revising the offer by reducing its ownership share.112 
NDRC also sought to bolster the technocratic legitimacy of its role in 
reviewing the transaction. The head of the Foreign Economic Research 
Committee of the NDRC’s Academy of Macroeconomic Research was 
interviewed by China Economic Weekly in November 2006, indicating two 
principal concerns about the acquisition.113 First, he feared the loss of indigenous 
innovation sources if Xugong were to be sold to a foreign entity.114 This would 
reinforce the acutely perceived problem of China becoming the world’s factory 
 
 106.  Id.  
 107.  Kailei Shougu Xugong Anjian Huigu [Review of Carlyle/Xugong Case], SHANGYE BAODAO 
[WORLD BUS. REP.] (Oct. 26 2006, 4:47 PM), http://biz.icxo.com/htmlnews/ 2006/10/26/960407_0.htm 
[https://perma.cc/C98U-GUK9]; Ma Tao, Kailei Shougou Xugong An Xiemu [The End of 
Carlyle/Xugong Case], NANFANG ZHOUMO [SOUTHERN WEEKLY] (Dec. 28, 2007, 1:09 PM), 
http://www.infzm.com/content/8003 [https://perma.cc/V64G-KXQ2]. 
 108.  See Shangwubu, supra note 79; see also Kailei Xugong Tijiao „Duwan” Jihua, (凯雷徐工提交”
毒 丸 ” 计 划 ) [Carlyle Xugong Submitted Plan against “Poison Pill”], CAIJUNG NEWS,  
http://www.caijing.com.cn/2006-05-13/10008163.html [https://perma.cc/C6YL-5T27].  
 109.  Id.  
 110.  In U.S. courts, the antitrust injury doctrine may prevent competitors from complaining against 
a merger as the proper plaintiff because an anti-competitive merger benefits competitors through higher 
prices. See Brunswick Corp. v. Pueblo Bowl-O-Mat, Inc., 429 U.S. 477 (1977). In merger review, however, 
U.S. authorities (like the E.U. Commission) are open to submissions and evidence from competitors. 
E.g., U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE & FED. TRADE COMM’N, HORIZONTAL MERGER GUIDELINES, 4–6 (2010) 
https://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/attachments/merger-review/100819hmg.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZJ 
Z4-3XDM] (“The most common sources of reasonably available and reliable evidence are the merging 
parties, customers, other industry participants, and industry observers.”).  
 111.  See Kailei, supra note 108. 
 112.  By October 2006, the proposal was revised to increase the price to be paid by Carlyle by 20%, 
while reducing its ownership share in the new entity to 50%. Id.  
 113.  See Xugong, supra note 96.  
 114.  Id.  
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while lagging behind in innovation. Second, Carlyle’s status as a financial entity 
was a concern, if it were able to manipulate its ownership share and increase it 
beyond 50%. The latter concern was important in the light of arguments made 
by Sany’s Xiang about Carlyle’s status as a private equity firm, 115  with no 
experience, technology, or network in the relevant industry. Such lack of 
experience suggested that Carlyle was seeking to reach a majority share of 
Xugong at a discounted price and make a short-term profit by reselling the 
company’s assets, rather than contributing to Xugong’s long-term 
restructuring.116 
The promulgation of new regulations, the delayed MOFCOM decision, and 
potential NDRC involvement signalled that the acquisition would not easily be 
approved. Furthermore, the reduction of its proposed share in the new entity 
from eighty-five percent to forty-five made the deal considerably less profitable 
for Carlyle. A joint statement by the two companies in July, 2008 indicated that 
Xugong would proceed independently with its restructuring.117 
C. Coca-Cola/Huiyuan 
Coca-Cola’s proposed acquisition of Huiyuan Juice Company attracted 
attention as the first merger formally blocked by MOFCOM under the AML.118 
The proximity in time to the abandonment of the Carlyle/Xugong deal and 
arguments about foreign takeover of a significant local brand fed the suspicion 
that the newly enacted AML would be used as a tool against foreign investment 
in strategic assets or national champions. Here again, fuller consideration of the 
record before the authority suggests a more nuanced conclusion about the 
different objectives and potential effects influencing MOFCOM’s decision. 
 
 115.  Wenbo Xiang, supra note 92.  
 116.  For contemporaneous debates about the role of private equity firms in the United States, 
including Carlyle itself, see Thomas Heath, Ambushing Private Equity: As SEIU Harries New Absentee 
Owners, Buyout Firms Dispute the Union’s Agenda, WASH. POST (Apr. 18, 2008), 
http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-dyn/content/article/2008/04/17/AR2008041704239.html [https:// 
perma.cc/4JA9-RF2Z]; Andrew Ross Sorkin, Sound and Fury Over Private Equity, N.Y. TIMES (May 20, 
2007), http://www.nytimes.com/2007/05/20/business/yourmoney/20deal.html [https://perma.cc/ZHE5-
VCJH]. 
 117.  See Xugong Jituan He Kailei Touzi Jituan Fabiao Lianhe Shengming Zhongzhi Hezuo (徐工集
团和凯雷投资集团发表联合声明终止合作) [Xugong and Carlyle Release Joint Statement Cooperation 
Terminated], SOHU NEWS, (July 24, 2008), http://news.sohu.com/20080724/n258343161.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/4JH7-9WKQ]. 
 118. Peter J. Wang et al., Antitrust Alert: Coca-Cola / Huiyuan Deal is First Acquisition Blocked by 
China Antitrust Review, JONES DAY PUBL’NS (Mar. 19, 2009), http://www.jonesday.com/antitrust-alert--
coca-cola--huiyuan-deal-is-first-acquisition-blocked-by-china-antitrust-review-03-19-2009/ [https:// 
perma.cc/WCM9-2F2D]. In June 2014, MOFCOM blocked the tripartite merger of foreign-owned ocean 
container-shipping companies. See MOFCOM Announcement No. 46 of 2014 on Decisions of Anti-
Monopoly Review to Prohibit Concentration of Undertakings by Prohibiting Maersk, MSC and CMA 
CGM from Establishing a Network Center, MINISTRY OF COMMERCE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
(June 20, 2014), http://english.mofcom.gov.cn/article/policyrelease/buwei/201407/ 20140700663862.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/DM3L-QLUT]. 
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1. Background and Facts 
In September 2008, Coca-Cola announced its intent to acquire Huiyuan, the 
leading fruit-juice producer in China. By December 2008, the proposed 
acquisition entered a second phase of review under the AML.119 On March 18, 
2009, MOFCOM issued a decision blocking Coca-Cola’s $2.4 billion acquisition 
of Huiyuan.120 
Coca-Cola’s proposed acquisition also had a restructuring dimension, this 
time in the private sector, given the planned shift in business focus for Huiyuan’s 
management. Zhu Xinli, Huiyuan’s chairman, founder, and main shareholder, 
initiated a shift from juice production for retail markets to concentrated juice 
extract for juice manufacturers.121 Huiyuan began to invest in fruit plantations as 
part of this strategic restructuring and invested in facilities for concentrated juice 
production in several provinces, while its juice manufacturing entity was to be 
acquired by Coca-Cola. The blocking of the merger put a break on those plans. 
Zhu had to refocus on juice retailing, putting aside the new concentrated juice 
business.122 The blocking of the merger also disappointed expectations of Zhu’s 
team because Huiyuan’s founders would not be receiving merger-related 
financial rewards or have the opportunity to work for a prominent multinational 
company after the merger. 
 2. Interests and Pressures 
As in Carlyle/Xugong, different stakeholders sought to influence public 
opinion and engage bureaucratic and political decisionmakers as part of the 
merger approval process. 
Local juice producers (Huiyuan’s competitors) formed an alliance in an effort 
to block the merger immediately after the MOFCOM filing.123 Assisted by a 
number of consulting firms, they collected and produced documents, eventually 
requesting a public hearing from MOFCOM.124 To argue against the merger, the 
juice producers invoked Pepsi Company’s previous takeover of Tianfu Kele.125 
 
 119.  Under AML art. 25–26, initial review of an acquisition is done within a 30-day period of the 
notification, after which any more searching review is to be completed within a further 90 days. 
MOFCOM had already published the notification thresholds for mergers and acquisitions by August 
2008. 
 120.  See Zhonghua Renmin Gongheguo Shangwubu Gonggao [2009 Nian ] Di 22 Hao (Shangwubu 
Guanyu Jinzhi Kekou Kele Gonsi Shougou Zhongguo Huiyuan Gongsi Shencha Jueding De Gonggao), 
(中华人民共和国商务部公告［2009 年］第 22 号（商务部关于禁止可口可乐公司收购中国汇源公司审
查决定的公告） ) [MOFCOM Decision on Prohibition of Coca Cola’s Acquisition of Huiyuan, 
MOFCOM Announcement No. 22 (2009)], (Mar. 18, 2009), http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/ztxx/200903/ 
20090306108494.shtml [https://perma.cc/E4MK-N984]. For English translation of the announcement, see 
China’s Statement Blocking Coca-Cola Huiyuan Deal, THE WALL STREET J. BLOG, (Mar. 18, 2009, 6:58 
AM) http://blogs.wsj.com/chinarealtime/2009/03/18/china% E2%80%99s-statement-blocking-coca-cola-
huiyuan-deal/ [https://perma.cc/M24M-Y3D8].  
 121.  See PHOENIX NEWS, supra note 78. 
 122.  Id. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Id.  
 125.  Id. As such, they were invoking precedent-based arguments to gauge likely effects. 
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Pepsi formed a joint venture promising to continue to buy from Tianfu Kele and 
maintain the brand. 126  However, Pepsi subsequently started to change the 
management structure, lay-off employees, and introduce its own branded 
products, while reducing the share of Tianfu products sold.127 Pepsi was also 
suspected of manipulating the joint venture’s profitability, so Tianfu recorded 
losses allowing Pepsi to take full control and eliminate Tianfu’s brand from its 
product range.128 
The Coca-Cola/Huiyuan deal generated substantial public interest, with 
nationalistic undertones and concerns about the loss of a famous Chinese brand 
to foreign control. According to a survey by China’s largest online news portal, 
eighty percent of the people surveyed did not want the merger to proceed 
because they were concerned about foreign companies’ tactics eliminating 
Chinese brands.129 Further, sixty-four percent of respondents did not think the 
Huiyuan brand would have a better future after the merger.130 Coca-Cola appears 
to have been sensitive to such public sentiment and made it clear that the 
Huiyuan brand would be retained under the deal.131 Additionally, Coca-Cola 
gave key Huiyuan personnel assurances that they would retain senior positions.132 
Apart from domestic opinion, the Chinese authorities were also subject to 
countervailing pressures, given the general signal the decision would send to 
foreign investors about government interference in their ability to profitably sell 
their Chinese assets. Specifically, Huiyuan’s foreign shareholders supported the 
deal.133 Warberg Pincus, a U.S. private equity firm, was regarded as the initiator 
of the deal because it held seven percent of the total share of Huiyuan and wanted 
to sell its shares for profit.134 Danone, the French dairy giant, also held 21.3% of 
Huiyuan shares and coveted Huiyuan for many years, but decided to sell out as  
 
 
 126.  See Tianfu Qisu Baishi: Yige Peifang Yinfa De Guansi (天府起诉百事:一个配方引发的官司) 
[Pepsi Sued: A Case Caused by a Formula], SINA FINANCE (Sept. 1, 2010, 11:41 pm) 
http://finance.sina.com.cn/chanjing/sdbd/20100901/23418589525.shtml [https://perma.cc/D6LN-UGAT].  
 127.  Id.  
 128.  It is said that the entire transaction cost Pepsi only USD $10.7 million. Id.  
 129.  Kekoukele Shougou Huiyuan Zhi Huo [Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Acquisition Confusion], SINA 
NEWS (Sept. 12, 2008, 9:49 AM), http://news.sina.com.cn/c/2008-09-12/094916280059.shtml 
[https://perma.cc/L5SG-AJTB]. 
 130.  Id. See also Hannah C. L. Ha & John M. Hickin, Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Deal Vetoed under China’s 
Anti-Monopoly Law, MAYER BROWN JSM LEGAL UPDATE, (Mar. 19, 2009), https://www.mayer 
brown.com/publications/coca-cola--huiyuan-deal-vetoed-under-chinas-anti-monopoly-law-03-19-2009/ 
[https://perma.cc/F5ED-4QE4].  
 131.  See Keko Kele Jihua Xianjin Shougou Huiyuan Chengnuo Jiang Baoliu Huiyuan Pinpai, (可口
可乐计划现金收购汇源 承诺将保留汇源品牌) [Coca Cola Plan to Acquire Huiyuan in Cash: Promised to 
Retain Huiyuan Brand], CE NEWS, (Sept. 4, 2008, 7:12 am), http://www.ce.cn 
/cysc/sp/info/200809/04/t20080904_16704746.shtml [https://perma.cc/9DHW-YTBN].  
 132.  See supra note 78.  
 133.  See Neibu Baogao Xiangjie Huiyuan 196 Yi Gangyuan Jiaoyi, (内部报告详解汇源 196 亿港元交
易) [Internal Report with Details about Huiyuan’s 1.96 Billion HKD Transaction], SOHU NEWS, (Sept. 4 
2008, 7:19 am), http://stock.sohu.com/20080904/n259363732.shtml [https://perma.cc/P32T-38LQ]. 
 134.  Id.  
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part of restructuring its Chinese business in light of a dispute with its Chinese 
partner in the beverage industry.135 
 3. Formalizing Decisionmaking Procedures 
MOFCOM’s decision came after an extensive investigation, during which—
as in Xugong—the Ministry proceduralized stakeholder input. 136  MOFCOM 
solicited information not only from other governmental authorities, but also 
trade associations, juice beverage industry competitors, juice producers, 
concentrated juice suppliers, downstream retail sellers, the parties to the 
proposed merger, as well as legal, economic, and agricultural experts.137 Given 
public interest in the case, MOFCOM held a press conference at which its 
spokesperson released details about the decisionmaking process and the forms of 
consultation used, which included the distribution of questionnaires, fact-finding 
events and hearings, on-site visits,138 designated investigations, and interviews 
with the parties to the merger.139 This suggests that MOFCOM had sufficient 
bureaucratic capacity to employ standard merger review techniques of more 
advanced regimes not long after the AML’s enactment. MOFCOM included 
Huiyuan’s competitors in the consultations: a December 2008 hearing involved a 
number of juice and beverage producers, as well as the China Beverage Industry 
Association.140 However, the list of consulted parties released by MOFCOM did 
not include the farmers who supplied raw materials to Huiyuan,141 customers, or 
final consumers. 
 
 
 135.  Id.  
 136.  AML, supra note 1, at art. 27 requires MOFCOM to consider the effects of a proposed merger 
on market access and technological progress, on consumers and other business operators, and on national 
economic development, though it does not specify the procedures and sources for obtaining input 
relevant to gauging likely effects or for the balancing of different effects.  
 137.  See supra note 120.  
 138.  On-site visits involved relevant local and municipal authorities, many of which had granted 
privileges to Huiyuan in the form of land or tax concessions that would be cashed out through the merger 
for the benefit of the new owner, further highlighting policy interconnections at different levels of 
decisionmaking.  
 139.  Shangwubu Xinwenfayanren Yao Jian Jiu Kekoukele Gongsi Shougou Huiyuan Gongsi 
Fanlongduan Shencha Jueding Da Jizhe Wen [Department of Commerce Spokesman Answers Reporter 
Questions About the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan Antitrust Investigation], ZHONGHUA RENMIN GONGHEGUO 
SHANGWUBU [MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA] (Mar. 25, 2009, 8:27 
AM), http://www.mofcom.gov.cn/article/zhengcejd/bj/200903/20090306124140.shtml [https://perma.cc 
/Z4AX-VNY5]. 
 140.  See Shangwubu Kai Tingzhenghui Keko Kele Shougou Huiyuan 3 Yue Jianfenxiao (商务部开听
证会  可口可乐收购汇源 3 月见分晓 ,) [MOFCOM Held Hearing On Coca Cola Huiyuan Merger: 
Decisions Expected Next March], FINANACE QQ (Jan. 6 2009, 7:53 AM), http://finance.qq.com/ 
a/20090106/000274.htm [https://perma.cc/B6CA-4GR2].  
 141.  Fruit farmers were one of the stakeholders negatively affected by the merger rejection, as 
Huiyuan had to go back on promises to purchase large quantities of fruit for the new concentrated juice 
business, for which affected farmers had been preparing for some years. Farmers failed to properly 
organize and communicate their concerns to MOFCOM, which reflects the fact that their interests are 
small and disaggregated and that they do not have a well-established producers’ organization to give their 
concerns a national voice.   
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Certain stakeholders sought to advance objections to the transaction and 
supporting material before MOFCOM. Hejun Vanguard Group (Hejun) was a 
consulting firm working with local juice producers to obtain a MOFCOM hearing 
for the competitors. Hejun cooperated with a college student campaign group 
targeting Coca-Cola’s “sweat factories” who had already written to MOFCOM 
requesting the merger to be blocked.142 The campaign group investigated labor 
conditions in Coca-Cola’s Chinese factories, producing evidence of Coca-Cola’s 
non-compliance with Chinese labor law.143 In a further line of attack, Hejun and 
the student campaign group prepared a letter to the Minister of Commerce, made 
publicly available on Hejun’s blog, in which they highlighted Coca-Cola’s labor 
practices. 144  The letter sought to counter arguments of two prominent 
government officials145 that the proposed merger should be treated as an ordinary 
commercial transaction raising no economic security issues. It pointed out that 
developed countries also aimed to maintain local ownership of famous brands as 
part of their merger review process.146 
The report on Coca-Cola’s labor practices was also channelled to the top 
officials of the Chinese government through the CPPCC’s Li Deshui.147 Li Deshui 
was chosen by Hejun as a prominent advocate of national economic security, 
claiming that two-thirds of the Chinese companies were taken over by foreign 
business, which he viewed as a threat to the Chinese national economy. 148 
Notwithstanding Li’s arguments, neither the local juice producers’—represented 
by Hejun—nor the student campaign group’s concerns were principally 
motivated by protectionist industrial policy. 
Though different arguments and policy concerns were aired, MOFCOM’s 
decision to block the transaction was written in standard competition-law 
language, as demonstrated by the six factors weighed in the approval process: the 
market shares of the merging parties; the relative market concentration; the 
merger’s impact on market access and technological progress; the impact on 
consumers and competitors; the impact on national economic development; and 
 
 142.  See PHOENIX NEWS, supra note 78.  
 143.  Id. Members of the campaign group had procured short-term summer employment with Coca- 
Cola to obtain the evidence that was the basis of their 28-page report. 
 144.  See Jiu Keko Kele Binggou Huiyuan Gei Shangwu Buzahng Chen Deming Buzhang De Xin (就
可口可乐并购汇源给商务部长陈德铭部长的信) [A Letter to Minister of Commerce Chen Deming on Coca 
Cola/Huiyuan Merger], SINA NEWS BLOG (Mar. 19 2009, 11:55 pm), http://blog.sina.com. 
cn/s/blog_4be5ea890100dblb.html [https://perma.cc/K5X9-WGV2].  
 145.  One was a member of MOFCOM’s international trade research institute and the other was the 
chief negotiator of China’s accession to the WTO. This demonstrates that core MOFCOM officials were 
not sympathetic to blocking the merger on protectionist grounds. Cf. infra note 206.  
 146.  SINA NEWS BLOG, supra note 144. The letter cited French efforts to block PepsiCo’s takeover 
of Danone by passing a law on strategic industries. For more recent reports of such screening of foreign 
investment, see Peter Lichtenbaum & David Fagan, Lessons in Mediating for Dairy Warriors, FIN. TIMES 
(Apr. 20, 2011, 8:12 PM), http://www.ft.com/intl/cms/s/0/5d6d2e9e-6b75-11e0-a53e00144feab49a.html 
#axzz3PRp0H9U2 [https://perma.cc/XH5X-T3FU]. 
 147.  See PHOENIX NEWS, supra note 78.  
 148.  Id.  
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the impact of the Huiyuan brand on competition in the relevant markets.149 
MOFCOM provided three reasons for blocking the transaction.150 
First, the merger would enable Coca-Cola to leverage its dominance in the 
carbonated soft drinks market into the juice beverage market. 
Second, Coca-Cola’s control over the juice beverage market would be 
appreciably strengthened by controlling two well-known juice brands, including 
Minute Maid as well as Huiyuan. Coupled with the leverage effect, this would 
raise barriers against any potential competitor seeking to access the juice 
beverage market. 
Third, the transaction would squeeze out smaller juice manufacturers in 
China, restrain local manufacturers from participating in the juice beverage 
market, and diminish their innovation. This would harm competition in the 
Chinese juice beverage market and undermine its sustained and sound 
development. 
The decision generated largely critical commentary from foreign antitrust 
practitioners and scholars. Although MOFCOM’s justifications do not veer too 
far from antitrust orthodoxy and no mention is made of maintaining local 
ownership of key brands, practitioners argued that the decision poses a daunting 
obstacle to future mergers of foreign companies with famous Chinese local 
brands.151 An article in Forbes suggested that the AML decision reflected China’s 
foreign investment laws and government policies, which do not support foreign 
firms buying controlling stakes in successful Chinese firms that do not require 
financial or management help, unless the Chinese firms obtain technology 
transfers or access to foreign markets.152 
One reason for the criticisms was that—in the absence of guidelines on 
assessing concentrations at the time—MOFCOM reached broad conclusions 
without offering supporting substantive evidence or analysis. For example, 
MOFCOM’s decision did not reveal the methodology used to define the relevant 
market, discuss the market shares of the parties or their competitors, or the 
degree of demand or supply substitutability. 153  Relying on market shares to 
establish a prima facie case154 is an understandable strategy to ease the burden of 
 
 149.  See AML, supra note 1, at art. 27; supra note 120.  
 150.  See supra note 120. 
 151.  Wang et al., supra note 118 (citing concerns about MOFCOM’s allocation of the burden of proof 
and unclear definition of market dominance); see also Jonathan Selvadoray, George Ji & Elaine Zhu, 
Coca-Cola’s Acquisition Of Huiyuan: A Lost Opportunity For MOFCOM, MONDAQ BUS. BRIEFING 
(Apr. 29, 2009) (“market players would have all welcomed a detailed decision” to “provide[] well needed 
guidance and transparency”).  
 152.  Shaun Rein, What Coca-Cola Did Wrong, and Right, in China, FORBES MAGAZINE (Mar. 24, 
2009, 6:00 PM), http://www.forbes.com/2009/03/24/coca-cola-china-leadership-citizenship-huiyuan.html. 
 153.  Coca-Cola/Huiyuan: First Chinese Prohibition Decision Under New Merger Control Rules, 
CLEARY GOTTLIEB (Mar. 23, 2009), https://www.clearygottlieb.com/~/media/cgsh/files/publication-
pdfs/coca-cola-huiyuan-first-chinese-prohibition-decision-under-new-merger-control-rules.pdf [https:// 
perma.cc/4JW3-FWRY]. 
 154.  Zhang & Zhang, Chinese Merger Control, supra note 13, at 488.  
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proof for an agency still building enforcement and analytic capacity.155 However, 
the decision provided no indication of how such presumptions could be rebutted, 
reducing the persuasiveness of MOFCOM’s reasoning on consumer-oriented and 
efficiency considerations. Zhang has argued that the outcome may also have 
reflected MOFCOM’s mis-borrowing of European Union competition law on 
leverage.156  Finally, given explicitly stated concerns about the effect on local 
competitors or industry development and the lack of consultations about 
consumer effects, MOFCOM’s decision was focused on producer rather than 
consumer interests. 
Because this was the first blocked merger under the AML, which involved a 
large multinational company and attracted international scrutiny, it is 
unsurprising that MOFCOM’s decision used template competition law language. 
MOFCOM had to justify its decision in the eyes of the international antitrust 
community and sought to use familiar competition law language. However, as 
this reconstruction seeks to show, the record before MOFCOM was much 
broader and touched on various policy goals potentially affected by the merger 
far beyond mere protectionism, including the impact on other juice producers, 
innovation, workers’ conditions, as well as local farmers. Thus, the competition 
law rationales offered in MOFCOM’s decision may not have convinced an 
international audience because they did not fully reflect the policy considerations 
brought to MOFCOM’s attention. 
Examining the fuller record suggests that the decision did not just reflect a 
single policy preference. Instead, it balanced a number of development-sensitive 
arguments in the face of uncertainty about the potential polycentric effects of the 
merger. First, the report prepared by Hejun and the student group documented 
Coca-Cola’s labor practices in China.157 From an orthodox antitrust point of view, 
an authority examining the labor market effects of mergers—typically whether 
the merger reduces total employment—injects non-competition considerations 
into merger analysis.158 However, the evidence in this case focused on Coca-
Cola’s poor labor practices in its Chinese operations rather than total 
employment levels. Apart from a potential direct negative impact on Huiyian 
employees, Herrigel, Wittke, and Voskamp point out that poor or exploitative 
labor practices are typically associated with low-level or “stingy” upgrading of 
the production and innovation capabilities of local firms from integration with 
foreign partners.159 Thus, if Coca-Cola’s exploitative labor practices are seen as a 
 
 155.  See Michal S. Gal, When the Going Gets Tight: Institutional Solutions When Antitrust 
Enforcement Resources Are Scarce, 41 LOY. UNIV. CHI. L.J. 417, 436 (2010) (positing that such a legal 
presumption would reduce administrative burdens for a less experienced authority). 
 156.  Zhang, Problems in Following EU Competition Law, supra note 11, at 117.  
 157.  See SINA NEWS BLOG, supra note 144. 
 158.  MASSIMO MOTTA, COMPETITION POLICY: THEORY AND PRACTICE 15–17, 22, 26–27 (2004).  
 159.  See Gary Herrigel, Volker Wittke & Ulrich Voskamp, The Process of Chinese Manufacturing 
Upgrading: Transitioning from Unilateral to Recursive Mutual Learning Relations, 3 GLOBAL STRATEGY 
J. 109, 114 (2013) (examining the insertion of Chinese firms in global supply chains in various 
manufacturing sectors).  
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proxy for poor upgrading potential of local productive capabilities from the 
merger, this may show that competition policy was colored by both distributive 
and development-sensitive considerations about the impact of foreign 
integration on labor conditions, local capabilities, and innovation. 
The possible effects of the merger on local farmers is also not explicitly 
mentioned in MOFCOM’s decision,160 which is not surprising given their absence 
from the hearings and consultations. But unlike a dedicated competition agency, 
MOFCOM had previously issued other policy guidelines indicating a preference 
for direct relationships between farmers and buyers such as retail chains, rather 
than a reliance on middlemen.161 At the time of the Coca-Cola/Huiyuan decision, 
scholars and some competition agencies expressed concern that a purely 
consumer-oriented competition policy ignores the negative effects of high buyer 
concentration squeezing farmers’ incomes.162 Though lower prices benefit final 
consumers, they have negative distributional consequences on farmers—often an 
already weak group—and also impact farmers’ ability to innovate and satisfy 
food safety standards. The integrated policy mandate of MOFCOM—not limited 
to competition policy—could ensure that such effects would not fall in a policy 
blind spot,163 particularly since they may be quite difficult to reverse. 
D. The LCD Cartel 
1. Background and Facts 
The final case study involves the alleged price-fixing cartel among foreign 
producers of liquid crystal display (LCD) screens.164 The case was investigated by 
 
 160.  See supra note 120.  
 161.  Zhu’s direct arrangements to purchase products from farmers appeared to be consistent with 
MOFCOM’s policy. However, empirical research showed some of the limits of MOFCOM’s policy to 
encourage small-scale farmers to deal with large concentrated buyers. See Xiaofeng Liu, Nongchao Duijie 
Moshi Xia Nonghu Canyu Yiyuan de Shizheng Yanjiu (农超对接模式下农户参与意愿的实证研究) 
[Empirical Research on the Participation Willingness of Farmers under the Mode of Direct Link Between 
Farmers and Supermarkets], 188 J. OF ZHONGNAN UNIV. OF ECON. & L. 116 (2011) 
http://xuebao.znufe.edu.cn/UploadFile/2011920205743163.pdf [https://perma.cc/73CF-HG2T].  
 162.  See Aravind R. Ganesh, The Right to Food and Buyer Power, 11 GERMAN L. J. 1190, 1197 (2010) 
(discussing the effect of buyer concentration on “the welfare of farmers producing at the bottom of the 
chain”).  
 163.  See generally Yane Svetiev, Competition Law and Development Policy: Subordination, Self-
Sufficiency or Integration? 4 EUR. Y.B. INT’L ECON. L. 223 (arguing in favor of integrating development 
policy goals into competition enforcement to avoid unintended conflicts between policy instruments). If 
the two mandates were wholly separate, consumer-oriented competition decisions could (often 
inadvertently) conflict with a policy to support farmer incomes.  
 164.  Though this case involved only foreign producers, the NDRC is not selectively enforcing the law 
only against foreign producers. See, e.g., Liang Yiyao Gongsi Longduan Fufang Lixueping Yuanliaoyao 
Shoudao Yanli Chufa (两医药公司垄断复方利血平原料药受到严厉处罚) [Harsh Penalties to Two 
Pharmaceutical Companies for Their Monopolization of the Supply of Key Ingredient of Compound 
Reserpine Tablets], http://jjs.ndrc.gov.cn/fjgld/201203/t20120306_465386.html [https://perma.cc/Y5U8-
7TYM] (NDRC fining two private pharmaceutical companies supplying the active ingredient for a 
popular hypertension medicine listed among China’s national essential drugs); Chen Litony, (茅台酒、
五粮液为什么被处罚) [Why Moutai and Wuliangye Got Sanctioned?], CAIXIN NEWS (May 8, 2013, 10:46 
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NDRC, which in January 2013, imposed fines totalling 353 million yuan ($56.8 
million U.S.) and corrective measures on six producers from South Korea and 
Taiwan, including Samsung, LG, AU Optronics, Chunhwa Picture Tubes, Chimei 
InnoLux, and HannStar Display for price-fixing violations between 2001 and 
2006 in mainland China.165 This was NDRC’s first case against an international 
cartel where none of the members were from mainland China. It was also the 
largest fine ever imposed by NDRC for unlawful pricing conduct.166 
The NDRC found that the companies sold more than five million LCD 
screens when the cartel was operative between 2001 and 2006 and made illegal 
gains of 208 million yuan (or around $33 million U.S.).167 Given that LCD panels 
account for seventy to eighty percent of the production cost of flat screen 
televisions,168 the cartel significantly increased production costs of television sets. 
Thus, the conduct harmed both China’s television manufacturers’ performance 
in international markets and final consumers by increasing the final prices of 
television sets.169 
 2. Interests and Pressures 
NDRC initiated the investigation only after receiving complaints about LCD 
price fixing—beginning in December 2006—from domestic television 
manufacturers and the China Video Industry Association, an association of 
producers of audio-visual equipment. The investigation was slow at the outset,170 
because it faced both legal and practical constraints. One obstacle was 
investigative resources: NDRC had only one division on pricing enforcement and 
 
am), http://opinion.caixin.com/2013-05-08/100524929.html [https://perma.cc/CK2V-3QMM] (NDRC 
fining China’s famous producers of premium liquor, Kweichow Moutai Co Ltd. and Wuliangye Group 
Co., Ltd. for resale price maintenance). 
 165.  See Eric Lin, China cracks down on price manipulation by global LCD cartels, SIMMONS & 
SIMMONS ELEXICA, (Jan. 8, 2013), http://www.elexica.com/zh-CN/legal-topics/antitrust-and-mergercon 
trol/08-china-cracks-down-on-price-manipulation-by-global-lcd-cartels [https://perma.cc/DS729XVG].  
 166.  See Sanxing Deng 6 Qiye Beifa 3.52 Yi Yin Caozong Yejing Mianban Jiage (三星等 6 企业被罚
3.53 亿  因  操纵液晶面板价格 ) [Six Companies including Samsung Fined 352 million yuan for 
Manipulating LCD Display Panel Prices], SINA NEWS (Jan. 5, 2013), http://finance.sina.com. 
cn/chanjing/gsnews/20130105/064814188769.shtml [https://perma.cc/PVZ9-8U92]. In more recent cases 
pursued under the AML, such as those involving the suppliers of infant baby formula and auto parts, the 
fines have exceeded this amount.  
 167.  See Guojia Fazhan Gaigewei Youguan Fuzeren Jiu Yejing Mianban Jiage Longduanan Da Jizhe 
Wen (国家发展改革委有关负责人就液晶面板价格垄断案答记者问) [NDRC Official Interviewed on LCD 
Cartel Case], PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA: NAT’L DEV. & REF. COMM’N (Jan. 17, 2013), http://www. 
sdpc.gov.cn/fzgggz/jgjdyfld/jjszhdt/ 201301/t20130117_523207.html [https://perma.cc/6H57-LFQF].  
 168.  Id.  
 169.  Id. As of 2008, the Chinese market had the largest demand for LCD screens in the world 
according to He Yabin, Vice President of the China Video Industry Association. See CHINA NEWS 
NETWORK, infra note 177.  
 170.  See Woguo Shouci Zhicai Jingwai Qiye JIage Longduan Zhongfa 3.53 Yi (我国首次制裁境外企
业价格垄断 重罚 3.53亿) [First China Sanction of 353 million yuan against a Cartel formed by Foreign 
Companies], NETEASE NEWS, (Jan. 5, 2013), http://news.163.com/13/0105/06/8KEFBGG400014AED. 
html [https://perma.cc/FSV4-EJU7]. 
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the investigated entities were aware of the agency’s staff shortage.171 Another was 
legal: the investigated companies thought that NDRC was unable to bring a 
price-fixing case because the AML was not in force at the time of the alleged 
violations.172 For this reason, NDRC pursued the case under the 1998 Price Law. 
Once the AML came into effect, NDRC expanded its anti-monopoly 
enforcement team from one division to three divisions. This led to more intense 
investigation of the LCD cartel beginning in 2011, including over 500 NDRC 
officials in fifty-five groups. 173  AU Optronics, the most highly fined cartel 
member, had already been heavily fined in the LCD cartel cases in the European 
Union and United States in 2008 and 2012.174 Given the prior prosecutions and 
growing investigative pressure in China, AU Optronics decided to self-report the 
cartel activities to the NDRC in 2012 and LG and Chimei InnoLux followed 
suit.175 The LCD Cartel members provided information to NDRC about price-
fixing activities, including details of fifty-three almost monthly meetings hosted 
by each member in rotation, to exchange market information and discuss price.176 
Apart from price fixing, the TV manufacturers’ complaints to the NDRC 
cited a number of other practices of LCD screen producers in the Chinese market 
that harmed their competitiveness. 177  LCD screen producers allegedly 
manipulated the supply schedule by withholding new technology products from 
the Chinese market. This was designed to extract higher prices for the older 
version of the product while inventories lasted.178 The practice also allowed them 
to maintain a higher price for the newer versions of their product. The China 
Video Industry Association further complained that LCD screen producers 
randomly and deliberately terminated supply to Chinese manufacturers. 179 
Finally, LCD manufacturers would not provide any quality guarantee on the 
Chinese market, until Samsung began to do so in 2010 by offering an eighteen-
month warranty, considerably shorter than the standard warranty period of 
thirty-six months in other markets.180 
  
  
 
 171.  Id. Contemporaneous accounts suggest that the NDRC made no progress in the investigation in 
the five years following the complaints.  
 172.  Id. 
 173.  Id. The case was eventually closed in 2013 after this shorter but more intensive investigation. Id. 
 174.  Id. 
 175.  Id. 
 176.  Id. 
 177.  See Jiemi Zhongguo Yejing Mianban Fanlongduanan: Youda Shuaixian Zishou Mian Fakuan,     
(揭秘中国液晶面板反垄断案：友达率先自首免罚款) [Revealing Details of China’s LCD Cartel Case: 
Fines against AU Optronics Waived for its Early Confession], CHINA NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 4, 2013, 10:59 
am), http://finance.chinanews.com/cj/2013/01-04/4455217.shtml [https://perma.cc/Y5T4-6GNY].  
 178.  According to the China Video Industry Association Vice-Chairman, suppliers delayed the 
provision of new products to Chinese manufacturers for up to two years. Id.  
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Id.  
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3. Formalizing Procedures and Remedies 
NDRC joined the competition enforcement game after MOFCOM, releasing 
its agency implementation rules, The Regulations on Procedures for 
Administrative Enforcement of Anti-Price Monopoly,181 at the end of 2010—two 
years after the AML came into force.182 NDRC has since been trying to catch up, 
ramping up enforcement after its increase in investigative capacities in 2011, with 
price cartels as a specific target. 
Unlike MOFCOM, which receives a steady stream of mergers for review and 
has adopted a regulatory process of establishing fora for stakeholder input, the 
NDRC must both identify and investigate what are often clandestine 
arrangements. While the NDRC had to develop its own mix of investigative and 
punitive tools, it has also engaged in advocacy in building a competition culture.183 
The Director General of the Department of Price Supervision and Anti-
Monopoly, has acknowledged both aspects of the NDRC’s antitrust functions: “I 
told our staff, launching investigation cases [is] the real deal. No matter how much 
you tell people and educate them, it won’t be as effective as an issued penalty.”184 
One important source of information about clandestine cartels is customer 
complaints. For the LCD cartel, Chinese television manufacturers were originally 
reluctant to raise their concerns with the authorities to avoid disruptions of their 
relationships with key input suppliers.185 The fact that the NDRC was a powerful 
and well-established economic regulator encouraged the local manufacturers to 
make their complaints even before the cartel prosecutions were successfully 
concluded in the United States and European Union. 
Leniency applications from cartel participants are another important source 
of information about cartels in mature antitrust jurisdictions. However, as 
knowledgeable commentators have observed, instituting a leniency regime is not 
sufficient to receive cartel information: unless potential applicants perceive the 
antitrust bureau’s investigative capabilities as credible, they have no incentive to 
 
 181.  See Nat’l Dev. & Reform Comm’n, (反价格垄断行政执法程序规定 2010 年第 8 号令) [Anti-
Price Monopoly Law Enforcement Procedural Requirements Decree 2010 8]，http://www.sdpc.gov.cn/ 
fzgggz/jgjdyfld/fjgld/201402/t20140228_588564.html [https://perma.cc/F4GS-NCTS].  
 182.  The regulations on merger notification and review were issued by MOFCOM by late 2009. See 
Jingyingzhe Jizhong Shenbao Banfa ( 经营者集中申报办法 ) [Measures for the Declaration of 
Concentration of Business Operators], MINISTRY OF COMMERCE OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA 
ANTI-MONOPOLY BUREAU (Nov. 27, 2009, 12:05 PM),   http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/200911 
/20091106639149.shtml [https://perma.cc/MP9X-P47E]; Jingyinzhe Jizhong Shencha Banfa (经营者集中
审查办法) [Measures for the Review of Concentration of Business Operators], MINISTRY OF COMMERCE 
OF THE PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA ANTI-MONOPOLY BUREAU (Nov. 27, 2009, 12:01 PM), 
http://fldj.mofcom.gov.cn/article/c/200911/20091106639145.shtml [https://perma.cc/73G3-QNZ7]. 
 183.  See Aydin & Büthe, supra note 50 at 11–12. The fact that clauses anti-competitive on their face 
are often included in contracts or model rules of industry associations suggests continued lack of 
awareness of the AML’s requirements among Chinese businesses. 
 184.  Veronica Lockyer, China’s Anti-Monopoly Law: No Longer Just Merger Control? 
ANTITRUSTWATCH BLOG (Aug. 1, 2013), http://blogs.orrick.com/antitrust/2013/08/01/chinas-anti-
monopoly-law-no-longer-just-merger-control/ [https://perma.cc/K5LA-LG6B].  
 185.  See supra note 177.  
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apply for leniency.186 Thus, in the LCD cartel case, it was not until the NDRC 
substantially ramped up investigation capabilities with additional staff and visits 
that cartel members decided to self-report. 
Pre-existing procedural law has been identified as one of the major legal 
constraints on effective enforcement of market regulation transplants in a new 
environment.187 In the LCD cartel case, the 1998 Price Law made no provision 
for leniency or fine reduction for self-reporting, nor for extraterritorial 
application of the law, so NDRC imported these new procedural tools from the 
AML. Thus, rather than being constrained by prior decisionmaking procedures, 
the LCD Cartel case demonstrates a process of backflow, whereby AML 
procedures inform the NDRC’s price law mandate.188 
Finally, remedial law can also impair effective antitrust enforcement by new 
adopters. Devising adequate remedies for competition violations is a notoriously 
difficult problem even in mature jurisdictions.189 Ideally, antitrust remedies aim 
to correct the market distortion, deter violators and compensate victims. Public 
law remedies are often quite limited to be able to achieve any, yet alone all of 
those objectives. Private remedies are additionally subject to cost and other 
constraints on accessing the judicial system, particularly for relatively small and 
dispersed interests. 
In this case, the NDRC creatively experimented with a set of hybrid remedies, 
responsive to a number of different objectives, including deterrence, 
compensation, market correction, and even industrial policy. 190  The final 
disposition involved levying an administrative fine on the defendant 
companies. 191  However, the fine collected was transferred by way of 
compensation to the manufacturer victims of the cartel. 192  As suggested by 
 
 186.  See WOUTER P. J. WILS, EFFICIENCY AND JUSTICE IN EUROPEAN ANTITRUST ENFORCEMENT  
125–27 (2008).  
 187.  See Antonina Bakardjieva Engelbrekt, Grey Zones, Legitimacy Deficits and Boomerang Effects: 
On the Implications of Extending the Acquis to Central and Eastern Europe, 1 SWEDISH STUD. IN EUR. 
L. 1, 31 (2006) (legal transplants may require alternative remedial approaches).  
 188.  Because the Price Law was silent on these points, such import could be justified on a dynamic 
theory of statutory interpretation. See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Dynamic Statutory Interpretation, 134 
UNIV. PENN. L. REV. 1479, 1479 (1987). Art. 14 of the Price Law prohibits “abnormal pricing behaviour” 
and because the Price Law and the AML have not been streamlined, this article defines a broader genus 
of prohibited conduct that includes price fixing cartels. See Yong Bay, China Joins International 
Crackdown of Price-Fixing Cartel for the First Time, CLIFFORD CHANCE BRIEFING NOTE (Jan. 16, 2013) 
(explaining that, unlike the AML, the Price Law does not require relevant markets to be identified) 
http://www.cliffordchance.com/briefings/2013/01/china_joins_internationalcrackdowno.html 
[https://perma.cc/T9UZ-R268]. 
 189.  See Robert Pitofsky, Antitrust at the Turn of the Twenty-First Century: The Matter of Remedies, 
91 GEO. L.J. 169, 180 (2002) (echoing Judge Posner’s conclusion that “antitrust enforcement, including 
remedy law, is deficient”). 
 190.  See Guojia, supra note 167. 
 191.  Id.  
 192.  See Mianban Fanlongduan Chixu Fajiao 1.72yi yuan Tuikuan Liucheng Jidai Guifan (面板反垄
断持续发酵 1.72 亿元退款流程亟待规范) [LCD Cartel Case Continues Drawing Attention Calling for 
Immediate Refund Procedure Regulation of 172m yuan], CHINA NEWS NETWORK (Jan. 8 2013, 7:31 am),  
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television industry players, the fine was transferred to the Shenzhen China 
Television Union Corporation, a joint venture of nine leading Chinese television 
manufacturers formed in 2007 at the companies’ initiative that was supported by 
a number of ministries. 193  The venture was intended to raise television 
manufacturing standards in China and safeguard competition by jointly 
managing research and development, solving intellectual property rights 
problems, and acting as an intellectual property incubator for the industry. 
Apart from the fine, the NDRC imposed a set of “corrective measures” 
governing LCD manufacturers’ contracting practices in the Chinese market.194 
The corrective measures included an undertaking by LCD manufacturers to 
supply Chinese television manufacturers in a “fair manner” and “provide all 
customers equal opportunity for procuring high-end products and new 
technology,” as well as to extend the free-warranty period for products sold to 
Chinese buyers from eighteen to thirty-six months.195 The corrective measures 
promote consumer welfare—because some of the impugned practices facilitated 
price fixing—but also reflect industrial policy—because they seek to advance the 
competitive position of Chinese manufacturers in world markets. Importantly, 
however, both aspects of the remedy do not involve protectionist industrial policy 
to shield local champions’ profits, but one aiming to ensure that Chinese 
television manufacturers can compete globally on the merits. 196  Behavioral 
remedies are sometimes disfavored from a traditional antitrust perspective for 
their regulatory character, given the need to monitor implementation.197 But if 
the authority has to monitor implementation, it can also evaluate the effects of 
its intervention over time instead of simply closing the case. 198  NDRC has 
reportedly closely monitored the activities of the six companies, with 
commentators suggesting that the prosecution has been of great significance for 
downstream television manufacturing in China.199 
  
 
http://finance.china.com.cn/industry/20130108/1225156.shtml [https://perma.cc/8P8S-CGZY].  
 193.  Id.  
 194.  Nathan Bush et al., China’s NDRC Penalizes Global LCD Panel Price Cartel, O’MELVENY 
ALERTS & PUBL’NS. (Jan. 7, 2013). 
 195.  Id. 
 196.  Fox, supra note 23, at 76–77 (emphasizing developing country desire to not “fence out” local 
businesses); cf. Sokol, supra note 103, at 1248 (“industrial policy threatens consumer welfare”).  
 197.  E.g., A. Douglas Melamed, Antitrust: The New Regulation, 10 ANTITRUST 13 (Fall 1995).  
 198.  See Yane Svetiev, Settling or Learning: Commitment Decisions as a Competition Enforcement 
Paradigm, 33 Y.B. OF EUR. L. 466 (2014) (articulating the particular importance of monitoring as a source 
of ex post accountability in multi-objective competition policy).  
 199.  See CHINA NEWS NETWORK, supra note 192.  
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IV 
CONCLUSION 
What do these three enforcement case studies from China suggest about the 
conditions conducive to successful implementation of competition law in 
developing country jurisdictions? Three factors have been emphasized 
throughout the case study discussions: (i) uncertainty about the impact of 
competition and competition law on various public policy or bureaucratic 
objectives, (ii) the creation of fora for consultation and input not only within the 
bureaucracy, but also with affected market stakeholders, and (iii) the balancing 
of various policy goals in the course of decisionmaking. 
The literature increasingly recognizes that tailoring a legal transplant during 
the legislative process is neither necessary nor sufficient for effective 
implementation.200 This is not least because the possible utility and effects—
particularly of a novel market regulation instrument such as antitrust—may not 
be apparent either to legislators or stakeholders without reference to concrete 
problems.201 As Pistor has argued more recently: 
Institutions are ambiguous, and fraught with tensions because of the distributional 
issues they inevitably raise, and because of their inherent ambiguity or incompleteness. 
Once a rule has been pronounced, it sets in motion multiple processes to establish its 
meaning and scope of application. Rather than establishing definite rules of the game, 
institutions become the focal point for contestation.202 
Such ambiguity is pervasive and cannot evade antitrust, which does not have 
a well-defined scope or metric of success, and has been used to pursue multiple 
goals even if the line of causation between competitive rivalry and those goals 
was not well understood. As a result, this article argues that facilitating “spaces 
for contesting the scope of rights and responsibilities of stakeholders”203 under 
the competition law is a key condition for successful transplant. Thus, one way to 
understand the factors that promote effective competition enforcement is to ask 
which factors are conducive to such contestation and which ones foreclose it.204 
A narrow or rigid vision of the role and goals of antitrust, focused on 
consumer welfare, efficiency, or market structure, and either imported from 
foreign models or based on bureaucratic or political decisionmakers’ well-
defined policy preferences would inhibit contestation. 205  Rather than being 
 
 200.  See Michal Gal, supra note 4 (analyzing the Israeli Competition Act); Svetiev, supra note 54 
(analyzing case studies of transplant of consumer law); see generally Ralf Michaels, “One Size Can Fit 
All”–Some Heretical Thoughts on the Mass Production of Legal Transplants, in ORDER FROM 
TRANSFER–STUDIES IN COMPARATIVE (CONSTITUTIONAL) LAW 56 (Günter Frankenberg ed., 2013).  
 201.  China may be peculiar in this respect in that contemporaneously with the AML legislative 
process, the Chinese authorities were reviewing cases that would ordinarily be subject to antitrust 
scrutiny (Carlyle/Xugong and the LCD cartel investigations were ongoing at the time). 
 202.  Katharina Pistor, Contesting Property Rights: Towards an Integrated Theory of Institutional and 
System Change, 11 GLOBAL JURIST 1, 6 (2011). 
 203.  Id. at 2. 
 204.  Arguably, many of the factors of success theorized by Aydin and Büthe, supra note 50, can be 
understood through this prism. 
 205.  See generally Fox, supra note 23 (discussing benefits of avoiding path dependency). 
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exceptional, the balancing of multiple objectives in enforcement should be 
viewed as unavoidable and desirable for a developing country’s competition 
regime. This argument rationalizes China’s almost Ulyssean effort to learn from 
foreign experiences while resisting wholesale adoption. It also underscores the 
advantages of the somewhat baroque AML enforcement structure, which taps 
the regulatory capacities of established authorities already embedded in the 
political system and with existing lines of communication with industry. Having 
somewhat different, if overlapping specializations, the three authorities provide 
sources of internal diversity in elaborating competition policy. Inter-agency 
competition and dialogue also promote contestation by further multiplying 
openings for stakeholder input. Even if the evidence generated by some 
stakeholders may be viewed as misguided or self-serving, they elicit alternative 
policy arguments and are a particular form of local stakeholder ownership of the 
new law.206 
For similar reasons, conviction about the soundness of current market 
regulation or about the robustness of competitive advantages of local industry 
can also inhibit effective antitrust adoption. Rodriguez and Menon argue that 
competition policy undermines “surviving institutional organizations” that 
overcome “historical resource limits and institutional constraints” and are pro-
competitive and economically advantageous.207 Yet China is probably not the 
only jurisdiction that has adopted competition law in the context of economic 
restructuring, presumably due to doubts about whether current economic policy 
and production arrangements are either satisfactory or sustainable as sources of 
development and prosperity. Where such doubts exist, competition law can be 
used as a tool of disruption, both for industry players and for policymakers. 
Limited uptake of a newly-enacted competition law would be expected if policy 
continuity is seen as desirable. 
A recently promulgated State Council opinion208  buttresses the view that 
competition law is seen as a source of policy disruption in China. The Opinion 
institutes a Fair Competition Review System for all public authorities at all levels 
of government, requiring them to assess the competitive effects of all proposed 
measures, as well as to review pre-existing policies, so as to aid efficiency, 
resource allocation, and innovation through “fair competition.” Such review will 
not be conducted by the national competition agencies, who are only to develop 
 
 206.  Importantly, both in Carlyle/Xugong and in Coca-Cola/Huiyuan, actors seeking to engage public 
opinion formulated arguments that were contrary to the positions of both administrative and political 
officials and those arguments were channeled via the CPPCC, a consultative body to the legislature that 
plays a political role. Contra JESSICA C. WEISS, POWERFUL PATRIOTS: NATIONALIST PROTEST IN 
CHINA’S FOREIGN RELATIONS (2014) (arguing that the Chinese government tends to manipulate public 
opinion for its own public policy needs).  
 207.  Rodriguez & Menon, supra note 32, at 61. 
 208.  See Guofa Hao Guowuyuan Guanyu Zai Shichang Tixi Jianshe Zhong Jianli Gongping 
Jingzheng Shencha Zhidu De Yijian (国发号 国务院关于在市场体系建设中建立公平竞争审查制度的意
见) [State Council’s Opinions on Establishing the Fair Competition Review System in the Development of 
Market System], PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA STATE COUNCIL, (June 14, 2016), 
http://www.gov.cn/zhengce/content/2016-06/14/content_5082066.htm [https://perma.cc/WF9C-E5Y5].  
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implementation guidelines for public authorities to conduct self-assessments 
before proceeding with any proposed measure. This form of mainstreaming of 
competitive considerations above all imposes deliberative discipline on public 
authorities.209 Given that formulating economic regulation or industrial policy 
often results in competitive restrictions, either inadvertently or due to capture, 
this form of self-assessment forces authorities to make such policy trade-offs 
explicit. 
The findings presented in this article also offer a refinement on the argument 
of a trade-off between “consumption” in new matters initiated and “investment” 
in building agency capabilities as a factor influencing enforcement success.210 
Investing in administrative capacity requires knowing what kind of capabilities 
are needed, which may presuppose commitment to a particular version of 
competition policy. Initiating new cases, by contrast, not only helps identify 
capacity gaps by reference to specific needs, but also allows the authority—
through seeking input—to enlist the capabilities and resources of affected 
stakeholders. In the LCD investigation, the NDRC had built up investigative 
capacities and partially piggybacked on the efforts of foreign authorities. But it 
was input from Chinese television manufacturers that revealed additional local 
practices by the cartelists. Thus, rather than simply fining the cartel, the NDRC 
could remedy its specific manifestations in the Chinese setting, while also 
enhancing local actors’ ownership of competition policy. 
Finally, one of the benefits of enlivening antitrust through contestation is that, 
as a result of such contest, either the output or the process of defining the scope 
of rights under the transplant can be accepted as legitimate.211 However, in the 
case studies presented, such legitimation may be lacking: where consultations are 
ad hoc and where only the result—and not the manner—of balancing various 
policy considerations in enforcement is disclosed by the authority, this leaves the 
impression of uncontrolled discretion. Strengthening independent judicial review 
of the authorities may correct this problem, 212  but courts have typically not 
bolstered antitrust enforcement by new adopters.213 Instead, both legitimation 
and policy learning objectives could be promoted by the authorities’ own 
formalization of decisionmaking practices, including both procedures for 
obtaining input from dispersed interests214 and analytical categories for choosing 
 
 209.  The Opinion requires public policies to “consult with interested parties or hold a public 
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 214.  See Jingyingzhe Jizhong Shencha Banfa [Measures on Anti-monopoly Review in Connection with 
Concentration of Undertakings], (promulgated by the People’s Republic of China Ministry of Commerce 
on Nov. 24, 2009, effective Jan. 1, 2010), PEOPLE’S REPUBLIC OF CHINA MINISTRY OF COMMERCE 
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or balancing policy considerations in competition cases.215 Even if the AML text 
and judicial review do not sufficiently stabilize normative expectations, 
formalization of decisionmaking mechanisms could, over time, constrain the 
enforcement authorities. This provides an alternative route to promoting rule of 
law values through enforcing competition law, rather than regarding the rule of 
law and judicial control as essential prerequisites for its successful transplant. 
 
 
 215.  See State Council’s Opinions, supra note 208.  
